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# 1. Executive Summary

The ISEED project - Inclusive Science and European Democracies <https://iseedeurope.eu/> - overall aims to construct a novel concept of “deliberative participation” designed to enhance both the quality and the legitimacy of political decision making. It will achieve this by focusing on the relevance of knowledge-based deliberation and by identifying some fungible traits and conditions able to contribute to active and productive citizen participation in public argument and deliberation.

This document, following the objective 3.2, contains a “Manuscript for academic paper presenting the typology” developed by 3.2 that aims to connect approaches and methods for public engagement in science-informed public discussion and problem solving.

Keywords: Civic engagement, public participation, typology, sociology, deliberative bodies.

## 2. INTRODUCTION

ISEED is a European project on public engagement that was proposed and developed by a European Research Consortium coordinated by Ca' Foscari University and it was funded as part of Swafs program. The project explores the conditions under which participatory and deliberative practices can be successfully implemented. ISEED is a multi-disciplinary project with a shared center of gravity in philosophy of science, social science (e.g., economics, political, communication, social psychology) as well as public management and engagement practice.

### ISEED project summary

ISEEDs overall ambition is to development a new conceptual approach to the understanding of the role and value of citizen participation in institutional decision-making that considers open, transparent, and shared access to deliberative processes. The ambition is to construct a comprehensive and empirically informed concept of deliberative participation that will be able to address participation and deliberation as a key challenge in contemporary democratic societies.

To this aim, the project will:

- Identify conditions in which active participation of citizens in public debate and knowledge production contributes to legitimate decision making in democratic societies
- Envisage new opportunities for active participation that empower citizens by reducing unequal access to information and increasing accountability and social inclusion
- Build a scenario wherein Europe, and European institutions, can be at the forefront of discussion on how to engage in fair, cooperative and competent political action based on an effective use of a well-functioning public sphere.

### Work Package 3 and Task 3.2

Within the ISEED project, the WP3 will provide a map of existing participatory and deliberative practices, with a specific focus on those including science-driven problem solving, in order to create a typology of the various implemented (and implementable) forms of public engagement that require active participation and effective forms of inclusive communication between citizens and experts/scientists.

The research activity in this WP will focus on the study of different participatory and deliberative practices but also on the analysis of general background of democratic participation experienced in the various countries involved. As reported in the project, the objectives of this WP are:

- OB3.1 - Providing an overview of participative and deliberative practices in the domain of civic engagement in science-informed public discussion and problem solving.
- OB3.2 - Creating a typology relating specific, relevant traits of those practices with different types of aims and intended impacts of deliberative and participatory processes.
- OB3.3 - Identifying the role and value of communicative processes in understanding the effectiveness of deliberative and participatory processes as presented by the typology in OB3.2.
- OB3.4 - Articulating a framework of best practices of public engagement in the domain of science-informed participation and deliberation.

These objectives will be achieved during the first two years and will be organized around three main tasks:

- Task 3.1 - Mapping existing participatory and deliberative practices in science-informed public discussion and problem solving [UNITN Leader (M2-M12)].
- Task 3.2 - Typology for public engagement and deliberative processes [DBT Leader (M12-M23)].
- Task 3.3 - Interpreting forms of inclusive and effective communication between scientists and citizens [UPF Leader (M10-M25)].

### **Interpretation of task 3.2 and D3.3**

Within this overall framework, and as part of ISEED's conceptual ambitions, ISEED task 3.2, "Typology for public engagement and deliberative processes", aims to create a typology relating specific, relevant traits of those practices with different types of aims and intended impacts of deliberative and participatory processes (OB3.2). In other words, the aim is to develop a general typology that connects approaches and methods for public engagement in science-informed public discussion and problem solving with the different forms of aims and intended impacts public engagement can have (description Task 3.2(i). Delivery D3.2 offered a report that includes

many general issues related to the development of a typology, including a discussion of what a “typology” means in the context of ISEED, and (which was the main task of the D3.2) a description of how the typology developed by T3.2 could be applied.

Based on D3.2., D3.3 delivers a “Manuscript for academic paper presenting the typology”. The task of delivering a “Manuscript for academic paper” has been interpreted as presenting the developed typology on civic engagement in a text with the typical length, composition, flow, footnoting and formatting that would be expected for a text to be considered for publication in an academic book anthology or as a journal article. Hence, the text is approximately 9200 words (11.200 with footnotes and figures) which is consider a standard length for an academic book chapter or article.

In addition, D.3.3 contains a longer annex which contains an empirical study to complement T3.1 with a focus on “barriers to citizen engagement.”



## 3. A TYPOLOGY OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

### Abstract

*This academic paper presents a typology for civic engagement. Despite a growing literature on deliberative democracy, we still lack a typological consideration of the place and structure of deliberate bodies for “civic engagement” in the context of conventional democratic systems. To that aim, this paper presents a typology of civic engagement, which seeks to capture the political complexities of political engagement activities that straddles the public sphere and parliamentary politics. This will be done by inspiration from the “Tripple Helix”-typology of innovation partnerships and drawing on Niklas Luhmann’s system theory. The typology of civic engagement offers a fresh account of civic engagement by employing sociological system theory to place practices theoretical in the broader context of public governance and the political system.*

### Introduction

The crisis of democracy occupies a central place in political and academics debates about social order. Deliberative democracy with its strengthening of the role of citizens in public politics beyond mere elections is by many viewed as a solution to some of the most daunting contemporary challenges to democracy and social stability. Concepts such a deliberative participation, participatory democracy and civic engagement therefore stands front and center to key debates about the future of democracy. The theory and practice of public administration is increasingly concerned with placing citizens at the center of policymakers’ considerations, not just as target, but also as agents.<sup>1</sup>

We understand “public deliberation” as deliberative processes that connects citizens with public policy or public administration decision-making. In other words, that the kind of practices/processes that we are interested in are distinguished by enjoying some sort of approval or mandate from public authorities: without such a formal link, we would see merely civil society activities. In another words, we understand the focus of the enquiry to limit its scope to cases where public authority has opened the political system to citizen participation. Such linking enjoys different names in the academic literature, and this report merely chooses the concept of

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<sup>1</sup> Brenton Holmes (2011): ‘Citizens’ engagement in policymaking and the design of public services’, Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services Research Paper, no. 1, 2011–12 22 July 2011.

[https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/942018/upload\\_binary/942018.pdf;fileType=application/pdf#search=%222010s%22](https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/942018/upload_binary/942018.pdf;fileType=application/pdf#search=%222010s%22) (accessed 12 June 2022)

“Civic Engagement”. We are here adopting the more classical concept of citizen engagement: “Citizen participation several decades ago, usually meant programs contrived by government to provide opportunities for citizens to have input into the public policy process.”<sup>2</sup> Citizen engagement requires an active, intentional dialogue between citizens and public decision makers.<sup>3</sup>

The academic literature usually contemplates civic engagement in the light of representative democracy and democratic theory. Democratic theory surely offers a relevant arena for debating legitimacy issues. But democratic theory, broadly viewed, is also a relatively unconsolidated debate<sup>4</sup> about the meaning and best practice of democracy. It has to a large extent been formed by a normative “model wars”, that is, “(...) an ideological struggle to define a best form of democracy situated around a particular form of practice.”<sup>5</sup> There is little literature addressing the question “what is democratic theory.”<sup>6</sup> And democratic theory fails to offer a coherent concept of political systems – probably due to the resistance of the dominant positions against one-size-fits all models of democracy. It’s simply goes against the ambitions of democratic theory to pursue typological frameworks as the dominant position guiding democratic theory developments is plurality and heterogeneity and fears about reification and simplification. Democratic theory broadly viewed does therefore not really offer an organizational and conceptual context for developing a typology of civic engagement as a functional composition in the context of the modern state.

Hence, despite substantial amount of work that debates and constructs models for civic engagement<sup>7</sup>, we lack a theoretical assessment of civic engagement as a separate form of political engagement in the broader context of public governance and the political system. To remedy this gap, this paper presents a typology of civic engagement. If *classification* offers a way of ordering empirical elements in accordance with each other in categories, *typologisation* is a more abstract ordering of these elements in accordance with their societal context. It’s a figure of thought, an intellectual construct, which can be employed to sort out things and establish principles of categorizations – a theoretical tool in the service of structuring our analytical

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<sup>2</sup> Terry L. Cooper (2005): ‘Civic Engagement in the Twenty-First Century: Toward a Scholarly and Practical Agenda’, *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 65, No. 5, pp. 534-535.

<sup>3</sup>Ilona Lodewijckx (2020): ‘The difference between citizen engagement and participation’, *CitizenLab Blog*, <https://www.citizenlab.co/blog/civic-engagement/what-is-the-difference-between-citizen-engagement-and-participation/>

<sup>4</sup> Dean, R., Gagnon, J., & Asenbaum, H. (2019). What Is Democratic Theory?, *Democratic Theory*, 6(2), v-xx.

<sup>5</sup> Rikki Dean, Jean-Paul Gagnon, and Hans Asenbaum (2020): ‘What Is Democratic Theory?’, *Democratic Theory*, Volume 6, Issue 2, Winter 2019: v-xx, p. xii.

<sup>6</sup> Rikki Dean, Jean-Paul Gagnon, and Hans Asenbaum (2020): ‘What Is Democratic Theory?’, *Democratic Theory*, Vol. 6, Issue 2, Winter 2019: v-xx, p. v.

<sup>7</sup> There are various examples of “citizen engagement” as the concept is used in this article. The most discussed are “citizen panels”, which typically has been used for deliberating questions related to climate change on a national level (for instance, in Ireland, Denmark, France, Germany) or sub-national level. The OECD has identified 12 models of representative deliberative processes, which are The models are: Citizens' Assembly; Citizens' Jury/Panel; Consensus Conference; Planning Cell; G1000; Citizens' Council; Citizens' Dialogue; Deliberative Poll/Survey; Worldwide Views; Citizens' Initiative Review; the Ostbelgien Model; and the City Observatory. See OECD (2020), *Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions: Catching the Deliberative Wave*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

perspectives on empirical practices. It's about making sense of the social environment.<sup>8</sup>

For ISEED's case, a typology of civic engagement will be viewed as a sensemaking tool, which can respond to question such as what are the underlying socio-logical characteristics of what we consider, e.g., a citizen assembly viewed from the perspective of a broader theory of the political system? How do citizen panels fit into their intellectual context of ideas of democratic politics and parliamentarism? How does Civic Engagement differ from civil society activities?

A typology of civic engagement, it is argued, will be a valuable tool for sorting out the debates about civic engagement and thus remedying some of the enduring political confusion that continues to encase and impede such activities. It will capture the political complexities of engagement activities that straddles the public sphere and parliamentary politics and deepen our understanding of the public policy complexities and dilemmas of participatory and deliberative democratic practices.

The typology will be based on an ideal-type analysis focusing on the distinction between the political system and the public sphere and the possible civic engagement-driven couplings between these traditionally viewed separate domains. The paper will employ an ideal-type analysis drawing from the Weberian tradition combined with the German Sociologist Niklas Luhmann's theories of the political system. This offers a broad academic perspective on society's functional differentiation and its configurations of civic engagement.

The choice of system theory to develop a typology of civic engagement stems from an inspiration from the "The Triple Helix" innovation model for co-creation across public authorities, political science, and industry (and civil society in the "quadruple helix"). The triple helix model, which remains a key framework for understanding cross-sectoral innovation setups, has to a large degree been formed by the triple (or quadruple)-helix typology with its root in luhmanese system theory.<sup>9</sup> While not directly applicable to civic engagements, the triple/quadruple helix model comprises many of the main ingredients for developing a typology for civic engagement.

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<sup>8</sup> See Harold Doty and William H. Glick (1994): 'Typologies as a Unique Form of Theory Building: Toward Improved Understanding and Modeling', *The Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Apr., 1994), pp. 230-251; P O'Raghallaigh, D Sammon, C Murphy: (2009) 'Theory-building using typologies—a worked example of building a typology of knowledge activities for innovation', *Bridging the Socio-technical Gap in Decision Support Systems*, 371-382, p. 372.

<sup>9</sup> See Franc Mali (2001): 'Modern Social System Theory and the Sociology of Science', *Družboslovne razprave*, XVII, 37-38, pp. 71-80; Galvao, Anderson; Mascarenhas, Carla; Marques, Carla; Ferreira, João; Ratten, Vanessa (2019-10-02). "Triple helix and its evolution: a systematic literature review". *Journal of Science and Technology Policy Management*. 10 (3): 812–833.

And as we shall see, the difference between civic engagement and triple helix collaborations offers insight into the complexities of civic engagement.

To be sure, ideal-type analysis, at least as a social science concept rooted in sociology, is not to be understood as the construction of ideal models in the sense of best practice. The task of ideal-type development is to describe how the features of an ideal-type are logically connected and verifiable in an empirical context. In fact, the concepts of ‘ideal-type’ and ‘typology’ are sometimes used interchangeably. As one scholar write, “(...) typologies, as ideal-types, are indispensable, socially situated practical tools for measuring similarities, differences, and developments in thought within and across time and space.”<sup>10</sup> Conceptually, they contain an internal coherence.

## Structure of the paper

The paper first introduces key elements of Niklas Luhmann’s theory of the political system to explain the underlying theoretical framework for the typology for civic engagement. It then explains the notion of civic engagement as a structural coupling between systems before contrasting the triple helix model of innovation with civic engagement as a form of democratic participation. After that, the paper shifts the focus from democratic models to parliamentarism as an ideal-type political system as the proper context for the typology for civic engagement, and then uses this to explain the place of civic engagement in the political system from the perspective of functional differentiation. Finally, the typology is outlined before a set of final reflections.

## Niklas Luhmann’s theory of the political system

The paper distinguishes civic engagement as a distinct form of interface between citizens and public policy or public administration decision-making. It’s a form that *connects* these domains thereby constituting a new democratic arrangement. More precisely, we characterize civic engagement as a concept that refers to practices/processes that enjoy some sort of approval or

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<sup>10</sup> Rachel Torr (2008): ‘Theoretical Perspectives as Ideal-types: Typologies as Means not Ends’, *Social Epistemology*, 22:2, 145-164; see also Ben Neffzger (1965): ‘The Ideal-Type: Some Conceptions and Misconceptions’, *The Sociological Quarterly*, 6(2); Giovanni Camardi (2004): ‘ideal-types and Scientific Theories’, *Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences and the Humanity*, 82; Pål Strandbakken (2016): ‘Weber’s ideal-types: A Sociological Operation between Theory and Method’, in Peter Sohlberg and Håkon Leiufrud (ed.): *Theory in Action : Theoretical Constructionism*. Brill Publishers.

mandate from public authorities: without such a formal link, we would see merely civil society activities. In other words, we understand the focus of the enquiry to limit its scope to cases where public authority has “opened up” the political system to citizen participation.<sup>11</sup> And it is this link, bridging or coupling across a conventional and fundamental *distinction* in public policy, which our examination will revolve around.

The work of Niklas Luhmann here offers a perspective that allows us to move beyond questions of legitimacy and representation and instead reflect on how citizen engagement as separate form of political engagement that links/bridges/couples the public sphere and parliamentary politics fit into broader structures of political systems. At the most fundamental level, Luhmann departs his work in a critique of the humanistic assumption that society including the political system is composed by humans and human relations. If that would be the case, he asks, then what part of the humans are part of society? Its arms and legs? Does democracy need food?<sup>12</sup> And the same questions can be asked about civic engagement. Civic engagement is not about individuals, groups of individuals, or any other form of bodily presence. Rather, it’s a certain form of communication.

To overcome the focus on bodies, physical fora, and relations, Luhmann developed an account of society as composed by multiple forms of communication. Accordingly, no such thing as an “a priori institution” of citizen engagement or any other form of political practice. And we cannot see intentions, mindsets, and thoughts of politicians, practitioners, and citizens. All we have access to in our observation of institutions is communication understood in its broadest possible sense: “In modern systems theory, society performs through its communication. These are its empirical reality, what can be observed and studied.”<sup>13</sup> From this viewpoint, Luhmann elaborated a theory of the political system in the constitutional state that identifies democracy as an effect of the totality of the structural regularities or *socio-logics* through which the modern society operates.

Accordingly, we shall already here shift our perceptive on citizen engagement from looking at groups and individuals and they interaction to focus on citizen engagement as a particular form of communication. Communication must stand as the central and only possible empirical focus of a sociology of citizen engagement.

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<sup>11</sup> Some scholars use the term “public participation” to denote the same form of engagement. See Rowe, G.; Lynn, J.F. A Typology of Public Engagement Mechanisms. *Sci. Technol. Hum. Values* 2005, 30, 251–290, p. 253f.

<sup>12</sup> Niklas Luhmann (2000): *Iagttagelse og paradoks*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, p. 62.

<sup>13</sup> Rihard Nobles and David Schiff (2004): ‘Introduction’, in Niklas Luhmann. *Law as a Social System*. Oxford: Oxford University press, p. 1—52, 1.

Luhmann pursued a broad descriptive theory of differentiated communication as the underlying fabric of society and democracy. Focus lies on structures, logics of practices and cultural dispositions for thinking and *practicing* democratic institutions, namely the imagined separations, or differentiations, between the public and the private, state and society, politics, and law, and so on. His sociology is based on the notion that the modern society works through a differentiation of several social systems, of which the main systems are economy, science, politics, art, intimacy and mass media. Implied by the word *practice* is an ontological standpoint that views democratic institutions (or any other institution) as social constructs that comes into existence through social practices.

Luhmann seeks to describe from a sociological perspective the shapes and logics of these practices as systems of communication that in various ways regenerates and generates the ideas and institutional framework of democracy. Functional differentiation of social systems works by instituting a relation between diverse practices that maintains a family resemblance of communicative elements through their differentiation to other forms of communication. These systems operate through general symbolic codes, namely money (economy), power (politics), love (intimacy), truth (science), which Luhmann calls symbolically generalized mediums for communication.

These systems should not be regarded as fixed or autonomous but rather as dynamic endeavors to differentiate themselves from each other and other environments by employing or assuming their general symbolic codes as fundamental references for communication. They maintain a distinction between themselves and their environment in the form of other social systems. And by “they”, we speak about the organization of communication and not any institutions or other human agency.

For example, law is a social system that in all aspects of communication refers to laws’ comparing of facts to norms through the application of the code legal/ not legal. Every single act of communication about the law or legal issues contains a reference to law as a social system distinguished from, say, politics and economy. Law operates according to the code legal/illegal, through which the legal system views its entire environment as well as distinguishes itself from its environment in the form of other social systems. The legal system is the legal system because it is not about economy, love, politics, and so on.

Similarly, economy as a social system is differentiated when money and namely money as

payment is involved as the main reference of communication.<sup>14</sup> The political system operates by observing itself and its context through the general symbolic medium of “power”. The defining function of the modern political system is “the production of collectively binding decisions”<sup>15</sup> – not intimacy, financial gains, or science. While decisions produced by the political system address issues of other sub-systems, like finance and science, they can only do so due to the difference between the systems. The systems observe and define themselves and thus operate by invoking these references as their differences to other social systems.

Examples of functional differentiation among these generalized mediums are the deep-seated beliefs that we should not mix money and political power (“corruption”), money and love (“money can’t buy me love”), science and political power (“politicized science”), and so on.

Concerns about such mixing of social systems mirrors the skepticism regarding mixing civic engagement into the sphere of policy making, viz. the oft-used notion of “extra-parliamentary” participation with the prefix “extra” indicating the disjointed character of such activities.

Luhmann views such troubled mixings as an expression not necessarily of normative assumptions but of the deeper functional differentiation and thus social organization of the modern society.

## **Luhmann on democracy**

Luhmann never focused on democracy as a standalone topic. He “[...] did not believe that democracy exists in the sense of the “rule of the people,” [yet] he did not deny that there is a mode of government in contemporary society that is named “democratic” and that this term usually refers to a “specific structural arrangement” of the political system.”<sup>16</sup>

For Luhmann, the decisive factor in and precondition for the formation of democratic politics is the functional differentiation of society and the structural arrangements of political organizations that enable the democratic election and legislative processes – and not these processes in and of themselves. He offers an analytical perspective on the more fundamental concepts that allow us in the first instance to imagine, speak about and practically organize such a thing as the parliament and democracy.

From an organization perspective, his interest lies not on separation but rather on the coupling,

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<sup>14</sup> Ivan A. Boldyrev (2013): ‘Luhmann’s Contribution and its Significance for Economics’, *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 265—292.

<sup>15</sup> Niklas Luhmann’s theory of Politics and Law.

<sup>16</sup> Hans Georgh-Mueller (2011): *The Radical Luhmann*. Oxford University Press, p. 101

integration, and inclusion of distinctive forms of communication in self-organizational systems. Luhmann offers a shift from focusing on voting, parties, and benchmark indicators to a focus on the functional differentiation that enables such practices to take place. He offers a shift in focus from agents and institutions to social structures in the form of regularities and coding of communication as social systems. He offers a recasting of questions such as “what is democracy” and “when is a state democratic” to the question of how democratic politics is structured.

That leads us from arguments for and against civic engagement to questions regarding the structural composition of such engagements. What differentiates various forms (participatory budgets, citizen juries, deliberative surveys, referenda, town meetings, online citizen forums, e-democracy, public conversations, collaborative policy making) of innovative or, sometimes, extra-parliamentary civic engagement from various forms of “conventional” political activities? How do we communicate about such activities as a separate category of political engagement? What enables us to speak about democratic politics in a meaningful manner?

## **The concept of civic engagement as a structural coupling**

From this perspective, we can describe citizen engagement, viz. the “role (...) of citizen participation in institutional decision-making”<sup>17</sup>, as a *structural coupling* between the public sphere and the political system (public authority). It’s a coupling that seeks to comprehend and order what OECD has called “Deliberative institutions” where forms of citizen deliberation that have been embedded in public decision-making procedures through legal mechanisms.”<sup>18</sup> This structural coupling between citizens (public sphere) and institutional decision making (public authority) defines the scope of the typology to be developed. Without an imagined differentiation between the public sphere and the political system their mixing would not stir up any attention.

The debates about the pertinence of citizen engagement mostly revolve around the promises and pitfalls of expanding the institutional coupling between the political system and the public sphere or even a merging of them. The debates about civic engagement can thus be viewed as revolving around certain issues related to the functional differentiation of society, namely, but not limited to, that between the political system and the public sphere. By the political system we mean the societal organizations related to developing and implementing legally binding decisions for all in

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<sup>17</sup> See ISEED Grant Agreement, Annex 1, Description of the Action, p. 21.

<sup>18</sup> OECD (2020), *Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions: Catching the Deliberative Wave*, OECD Publishing, Paris.



society—from agenda setting, policy formulation, and adoption (or decision making) to implementation and evaluation. From this perspective, we may view the pros and cons of civic engagement and their advocating for or concerns about a softening, bridging, merging or even dismantling of the conventional distinction between parliaments and the public sphere, between elected politicians and citizens.

In that way, issues related to feasibility and legitimacy tend to be directly or indirectly preoccupied with this functional differentiation and its possible softening: functional differentiation is thus a primary reference and organizing principle for the discussions.<sup>19</sup> At a theoretical level we may thus view the debates about civic engagement as a debate revolving around a certain issue related to the functional differentiation of society. Accordingly, a key question of the present analysis will be what happens to our political system when citizen engagement amends a constituent functional differentiation.

## Triple Helix vs. Civic Engagement

Before turning to citizen engagement as a particular form of engagement, let's turn our attention to a closely related engagement area, which is innovation partnership between public authorities, researchers, private sector, and citizens. The academic and political understanding of such cross-sectoral engagements has to a large extent been formed by the "triple helix"-concept with its firm root in communication-focused social system theory as developed by the German sociologist, Niklas Luhmann.<sup>20</sup> The triple helix model is a sociological metaphor and an "(...) analytical construct that synthesizes the key features of university–industry–government partnerships."<sup>21</sup> That is, a *typology* developed to help us think about knowledge-based innovation systems straddling the university, industry, and government – and citizens, if we speak about the quadruple helix.

The typology with its iconic metaphor in the form of a DNA-helix emerged from studies of governments partnering with universities and industries to strengthen the development and

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<sup>19</sup> Anders Esmark (2009): 'The functional differentiation of governance: Public governance beyond hierarchy, market and networks', *Public Administration*, 87(2):351 – 370; Scholars who have taken a similar path include Simon Calmar Andersen and Jørn Loftager (2014): 'Deliberative Democratic Governance'. *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, 36, pp. 510-529; Simone Chambers (2017): 'Balancing Epistemic Quality and Equal Participation in a System Approach to Deliberative Democracy'. *Social Epistemology*. 31 (3): 266–76.

<sup>20</sup> Loet Leydesdorff (1996): 'Luhmann's Sociological Theory: Its Operationalization and Future Perspectives', *Social Science Information* 35(2), pp. 283-306.

<sup>21</sup> Marina Ranga (2013): 'Triple Helix Systems: An Analytical Framework for Innovation Policy and Practice in the Knowledge Society', *Industry and Higher Education*, 27(4):237-262, p. 237.

implementation of ideas that result in the introduction of new or advancement of existing goods, services, technology, or organizations in support of a common good.<sup>22</sup> It was developed as a social system theoretical perspective to describe and understand the social but also political complexities of interweaving societal sectors with different bottom lines around a common cause.<sup>23</sup> In focus was the socio-logical dynamics of cross-sectoral collaboration to produce innovation through knowledge sharing, production, and co-creation.<sup>24</sup>

The triple-helix typology can be viewed as a deparadoxization of an otherwise paradoxical cooperation between functionally different entities (science, industry, government) with different fundamental outlooks (truth, profit, political power). The apparent paradoxes lie in coupling the financial outlook or coding of private sector agents, the truth-oriented system of science, and public interest to serve the interest of society. These functional systems are usually viewed as being fundamentally contradictory, as (in a well-ordered society) you “can’t buy” truth, science, and politics; the aim of science is not profit (but truth); etc. The government component is here included as a dimension of knowledge production that comes with a certain fundamental rationality and outlook that differs from science, commercial companies, and citizens.

The quadruple helix concept emerged as scholars started to describe civil society engagement in such practices.<sup>25</sup> Usually, the civil society component as the fourth leg of the quadruple helix is associated with the media, creative industries, culture, values, lifestyles, art and society.<sup>26</sup> But as part of that compact, the quadruple helix concept recognized citizens as knowledge-producers and thus added citizen science as a fourth helix-leg. The move from the triple to the quadruple

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<sup>22</sup> Galvão, Anderson et. al. (2019): ‘Triple Helix and its Evolution: A Systematic Literature Review’, *Journal of Science and Technology Policy Management*, 10(3), pp.812-833; García-Terán, J., Skoglund, A. (2019): ‘A Processual Approach for the Quadruple Helix Model: the Case of a Regional Project in Uppsala’. *Journal Knowledge Economy* 10, 1272–1296, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup> Loet Leydesdorff (2021): *The Evolutionary Dynamics of Discursive Knowledge Communication-Theoretical Perspectives on an Empirical Philosophy of Science*. Amsterdam: Springer, pp. 22ff.

<sup>24</sup> Henry Etzkowitz and Alice Zhou (2019): ‘Triple Helix: a universal innovation model?’, in Dagmar Simon, Stefan Kuhlmann, Julia Stamm, and Weert Canzler (ed.): *Handbook on Science and Public Policy*. Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 357–375; see also Cai, Y., & Etzkowitz, H. (2020): ‘Theorizing the Triple Helix model: Past, present, and future’, *Triple Helix*, 7(2-3), 189-226.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.; Borkowska, K., Osborne, M. (2018): ‘Locating the fourth helix: Rethinking the role of civil society in developing smart learning cities’. *Int Rev Educ* 64, 355–372 (2018)

<sup>26</sup> Carayannis, E.G. and Campbell, D.F. (2009), “‘Mode 3’and‘Quadruple helix’: toward a 21st centuryfractal innovation ecosystem”, *International Journal of Technology Management*, Vol. 46 Nos 3/4, pp. 201-234, p. 206.

helix model indicates a shift from considering citizens as invisible<sup>27</sup> to ascribing them a weighty and reactive role. It offered a perspective on the growing collaboration<sup>28</sup> between the political system including public administration, researchers, industry consultants and civil society in attempts to pursue shared innovation or policy development objectives.

## From innovation helix to citizen engagement

Citizen engagement, as we understand it in this paper, involves a similar helix-shaped co-creation modality. Yet while the territory of the triple/quadruple helix is innovation, civic engagement sits within the territory of public policy making. In other words, civic engagement, as we understand the concept, alludes to a structural coupling to the political system. It's an activity that transgresses a formal distinction between public policy development as a function of the political system and private citizens by introducing citizens as direct participatory subjects in public policy development. In contrast, public authority involvement in innovation falls within the domain of policy implementation. Public authority involvement in civic engagement falls within the domain of policy development. Accordingly, while the triple/quadruple helix model implies that public agencies enter the innovation system; civic engagement involves a model where citizens enter the political system.

The triple/quadruple helix model of innovation has proved very useful when it comes to describing innovation systems that open to include the political system, typically its administrative bodies. Yet the model falls short when it comes to considering what happens when the political system opens to citizens. And the helix-literature hardly contains any noteworthy references to democracy.<sup>29</sup>

The distinction to be drawn between the two modes of engagement lies at their respective fundamental rationalities: Innovation focuses on technological and scientific innovation that can bring economic and social growth. From a system theoretical perspective, we may view this a

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<sup>27</sup> Florian Schütz, Marie Lena Heidingsfelder, Martina Schraudner (2019): 'Co-shaping the Future in Quadruple Helix Innovation Systems: Uncovering Public Preferences toward Participatory Research and Innovation', *The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation*, Volume 5, Issue 2, Summer 2019, Pages 128-146.

<sup>28</sup>See Alfonsi, A. Fondazione Adriano et. Al. (2021): 'Quadruple Helix Collaborations in Practice Stakeholder Interaction, Responsibility and Governance', HORIZON 2020 'Reconfiguring Research and Innovation Constellations' (RiConfigure).

<sup>29</sup> See Galvão, Anderson et. al. (2019): 'Triple Helix and its Evolution: A Systematic Literature Review', *Journal of Science and Technology Policy Management* 10(3), pp.812-833, p. 817f.

difference in the code of functionally differentiated systems: the code of innovation is ‘more or less growth’, measured in economic development or solutions to societal problems; the code of politics is that of political power, viz. inclusion/exclusion. In comparison, civic engagement ties on to the code of the political system, which is way more complex than the innovation system due to its complex of political representation, legitimacy, authority, etc.

The public sector can in general be disaggregated into two domains: upstream bodies at the center of government, which supports policy developments for governments, and downstream delivery bodies which deliver, commission or fund services under the policy direction of government.<sup>30</sup> In a nutshell, we may think of the difference between these two forms of “opening up” as one form where public authority engages in partnerships including with citizens *downstream* (implementation) versus another form where citizens engage with public authority *upstream* (policy development). The latter form raises questions about the implications of institutionalizing political activities across the division between government and the public that forms a constituent separation across democratic systems with their core of parliamentarism. From a public policy perspective, this is a much more complex “form” of engagement than innovation partnerships.

As we shall see, in addition to the functional separation between the public sphere and the political system, institutionalized citizen panels “irritate” other fundamental distinction, which our dominant models of political system imply, and that is the parliamentary distinction between government and the opposition: Democratic politics rests on a functional separation of legislative (political), judiciary and executive powers. Yet it also rests on functional separations of government and the public *as well as* of the ruling party and the opposition. If citizen engagement is “brought inside” the political system, it affects the power balance between these.

## **Parliamentarism as an ideal-type political system**

As a bridge to the ideal-type analysis, our first move will be to change our frame of interpretation from democratic theory to parliamentarism.<sup>31</sup> The argument that will be made is that parliamentarism constitutes the primary organizational context for institutionalized citizen

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<sup>30</sup> See Francis Fukuyama (2013): ‘What Is Governance?’, *Governance*, Vol 26, pp. 347-368.

<sup>31</sup> In the related area of Technology assessment (TA), “parliament” rather than “democracy” forms the main concern for discussing engagement and its place and role in the political system. See Lars Klüver, Rasmus Øjvind Nielsen and Marie Louise Jørgensen (2016): *Policy-Oriented Technology Assessment Across Europe: Expanding Capacities*. London: Palgrave.

panels, while “democratic institutions” appears much vaguer and unsettled as a concept<sup>32</sup>, and that democracy also must be considered not as an entailment of, but a subordinate possibility enabled by parliamentarism. In other words, that parliamentarism continues to be the spine of liberal democratic politics and thus also the underlying template for civic engagement and citizen panels. Therefore, parliamentarianism appears to be the proper conceptual structure for developing a typology of civic engagement.

As “[p]arliamentarism [historically viewed] was manifestly not equivalent to constitutional democracy”<sup>33</sup>, and that the nexus between the concepts of ‘parliamentary’ and ‘representative democracy’ were propelled primary by reactions to Nazism and fascism and, later, European integration, the conflation of ideas of the concepts of parliamentarism and democracy is shrouded in political agendas spurred by some most significant but also convoluted processes in recent European history.<sup>34</sup>

In fact, democratic theory generally failed to consider parliamentarism as part of their research agenda<sup>35</sup>, something that apparently causes some challenges for democratic theory when addressing inherently parliamentary issues such as the question of coupling civic engagement to parliaments. The drivers and arguments for and against such coupling may be addressed by democratic theory but the more technical aspects and implications to the understanding of the political system as a functionally differentiated organization requires the involvement of contemporary debates about parliamentarism.<sup>36</sup>

What can be argued, however, is that the broad notion of “democratic institutions” contains both elements, but that parliamentarism is mostly viewed as a key foundation of representative democracy. As William Selinger points out in this book, *Parliamentarism: from Burke to Weber*, “parliamentarism”, and not “democracy”, stood at the core of many canonical European liberal writers’ ambitions regarding freedom and liberty – from Montesquieu to John Stuart Mill.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> see Rikki Dean, Jean-Paul Gagnon, and Hans Asenbaum (2020): ‘What Is Democratic Theory?’, *Democratic Theory*, Volume 6, Issue 2, Winter 2019: v–xx, p. v.

<sup>33</sup> William Selinger (2019): *Parliamentarism - From Burke to Weber*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 6.

<sup>34</sup> See Pasi Ihalainen (2021): ‘Parliaments as Meeting Places for Political Concepts’, 30 September 2021 <https://intellectualhistory.web.ox.ac.uk/article/parliaments-as-meeting-places-for-political-concepts>

<sup>35</sup> Kari Palonen & José María Rosales (2015): *Parliamentarism and Democratic Theory: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*. Leverkusen: Verlag Barbara Budrich

<sup>36</sup> The historical intellectual “battle” of parliamentarism unfolded in the Weimar republic between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt.

<sup>37</sup> William Selinger (2021): *Parliamentarism: from Burke to Weber*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Over the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the concept of democracy came to occupy the nodal point of the discussions of political regimes while “the parliamentary style of acting politically has never achieved an equally canonic status.”<sup>38</sup> And hence, the 20<sup>th</sup> century battles about citizen rights and political participation were organized around the concept of democracy, not parliamentarism. Yet parliamentarism and democracy remain separate concepts and the tension between them has been the subject of fierce intellectual debate.<sup>39</sup>

What is also clear is that that, historically viewed, democratic politics as we understand the concept today emerged and matured in the permissible political environment of parliamentarism. And that democratic politics anchors its regime in parliamentarism. Institutionally viewed, democratic politics stands on parliamentarism, and not the other way around: We can imagine parliamentarism without democracy; but not democracy without parliamentarism. At least, that would be a radical different form of democracy than its contemporary forms. Such regimes do not exist.

The Finnish political scientist, Kari Palonen, argues that the idea of the parliament stands so strong that it should be considered an ‘ideal-type’, a normative ideal as well as a guiding concept for organizing political life.<sup>40</sup> It’s a historical-empirical idea and reality that we recognize and accept as a conventional and foremost typology for organizing legislative assemblies in states. By the 1900, Russia, Turkey, and Montenegro remained the only European states without a parliament. Today, all the world’s 195 countries have some sort of parliament.<sup>41</sup>

When contemplating a possible adjustment of the roles, powers and responsibilities of non-elected persons in the context of the parliament, what is at stake is issues related to the idea of parliamentarism rather than the idea of constitutional democracy. “Constitutional democracy” is not an ideal-type – “parliament” is. That perspective provides a direct bridge for an ideal-type examination of a second chamber model for civic engagement.

## **Parliamentarism and the typology of civic engagement**

If parliament can be considered an ideal-type, then we can also explore extra-parliamentary forms of political participation such as citizen engagement from that ideal-typical perspective.

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<sup>38</sup> K. Palonen (2019): *Parliamentary Thinking: Procedure, Rhetoric and Time*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 225.

<sup>39</sup> See Carl Schmitt (1988): *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*. Boston: MIT Press Ltd, chapter 2 (‘Democracy and Parliamentarism’)

<sup>40</sup> R. Aerts & Van der Berg, p. 2

<sup>41</sup> See Interparliamentary Union <<https://www.ipu.org/about-us>>

And if citizen engagement can be understood as a form of extra-parliamentary political participation, then we can examine them as an ideal-type. In that regard, the concept of the extra-parliamentary will be employed to denote upstream citizen engagement that bridges public sphere processes to the parliamentary policy-making processes in ways that moves beyond the ideal typical thinking about the voter-based coupling of citizens and elected representatives.<sup>42</sup> As mentioned, this “bridge” or coupling constitutes the defining feature of “civic engagement.” From an institutional perspective, such engagements imply an amendment of the conventional parliamentary functional separation of elected parliamentarians and non-elected citizens.

## **Civic engagement and the political system**

A key point to be made for our focus on civic engagement as a form of extra-parliamentary involvements in the political system is that institutionalized citizen panels irritate fundamental divisions of the modern liberal political system, namely the division between government and the public and the division between government and opposition, because the structural coupling of citizen panels to parliamentary politics (composed by government and opposition) implies a coupling to both government and opposition. This irritation can be observed even in relation to engagement practices without a firm mandate to influence policy. To be sure, the reservations towards institutionalizing citizen panels merely epitomizes the more general concern about opening the political system towards non-election engagement practices.

The focus on these divisions allows us to turn our attention away from questions of how the activities of such bodies may impact on government and opposition in terms of policy output to reflect on the implications to the political system itself. This becomes clear when we contrast our concept of citizen engagement with Luhmann’s concept of the political system, which identifies a set of fundamental differentiations that codifies the relationship between politics, administration, and the public.

The first primary division of the political system is a two-level coding: on the one hand, we have the distinction between government and governed, i.e., the distinction between those in power and those subjected to power. On the other hand, we have the distinction between government and opposition, i.e., the distinction between government parties and oppositions parties.<sup>43</sup> This coding reflects the composition of the parliament as a venue for political conflict between

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<sup>42</sup> In essence, we can view this as an expression of the historical tension between the democratic promise of democracy as the rule of the people by representation and the historically unyielding institution of parliament.

<sup>43</sup> Luhmann, *Law as a Social System*, pp. 71f.

government parties and opposition parties. It can be viewed as a typologization of the “old answer to the question of what ‘government’ distinguishes itself from is ‘the governed’”<sup>44</sup>, combined with the liberal distinction between government and opposition.

The second division is between politics and administration. While politics is concerned with decision making, including procedures for decision making, administration is concerned with the practical operationalization of decisions in the form of translation of power into law<sup>45</sup> and policy implementation. This includes the operationalization of constitutional and other regulatory framework applicable to politics. That gives administration a separate function. The preconditions for politics, administration and public to function effectively is their ability to maintain their respective functional differentiation from each other as well as other systems.

When viewed from the perspective of system theory what is at stake here is really the functional coding of administration and policies as two sub-systems of the political system. Central to these concerns stands a confusion about communication and the codes of the respective systems. Because if the civil servant social system starts to communicate through the general medium of power, then what is then the difference between politics and administration?

Luhmann views this division between politics and administration as a prerequisite for the political system.<sup>46</sup> It’s not only about the administrative execution of political decision. It is also about administering constitutional checks and balances as a counterweight to political power. A key point is that the more well developed the administration, the larger complexity it can handle. Again, this is not about administrative capacities in terms of staffing and resources. It’s about the communicative detailing of functional areas and their relation. Hence states divide administration into ministerial areas that in themselves constitutes sub-systems.

Now, in addition to administration and politics, Luhmann’s theory of the political system includes a third dimension, which is which is the public. This is not a division of the political system into subsystems, “(...) but the result of a double distinction: on one side, political offices are differentiated from administrative offices, and, on the other side, the unity of offices are differentiated from the public composed of citizens.”<sup>47</sup> Politics, the creation of policy, derives its authority, or legitimacy, because of its separation from the public, a separation that

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<sup>44</sup> Wiliam Rasch (2004): *Sovereignty and its Discontents*. Birbeck: Birbeck Law Press, p. 8

<sup>45</sup> Thornhill, p. 194.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 80.

<sup>47</sup> Claudio Baraldi, Giancarlo Corsi, & Elena Esposito (2021): ‘Unlocking Luhmann - A Keyword Introduction to Systems Theory: A Keyword Introduction to Systems Theory’, Bielefeld University Press, p. 173.



administration upholds.

According to Luhmann, the political system depends on this “triadic differentiation”, which is not a hierarchy – but a functional differentiation. Its critical to notice that ‘the public’ does not refer to the people as a unit, a superior instance, or a general will. It is a coding of communication. It may also be noticed that the triadic differentiation reflects the composition of the parliament as a venue for political conflict between the government and opposition and the demarcated boundary between government and the governed.

### **Functional differentiation and deliberative democratic participation**

Adding a citizen panel as a form of second chamber to parliament will inevitably alter the content of political debates within parliament. It will also alter parliamentary politics as a certain symbolic coding of communication. Mixing parliamentary politics and citizen political participation is mixing fundamental categories of the political system and how communication about politics is organized.

The often-used concept of the ‘extra-parliamentary’ indicates that we don’t have a clear concept to communicate about such activities. It suggests non-conventional or even temporary measures (and the prospect of a return to normalcy?). Similarly, the concept of “hybrid”, which is also often used to denote amalgamations of governance domains, indicates a mix without providing any hope of an actual conceptual clarification.

This identification of a code for the “extra-parliamentary” should be understood as an observation and not a normative standpoint. We are after something descriptive rather than prescriptive. We are after an observation of how the unsettledness affects communication. At first, we see a confusion about what civic engagement could and should be and do. And what seems like a good idea (citizen panels, scaled up civic engagement) tends to encounter more deep-seated challenges as soon as we move towards a “harder” concept.

From a system theory perspective, these challenges are only secondarily about bestowing citizens with formal powers vis-à-vis the political system. The primary challenge lies with describing a new form of structural coupling across a system of functional differentiation that forms the backbone of the political system. It’s about accommodating the irritation of the symbolic coding the political system relies on, caused by the mixing of parliamentary and “extra-parliamentary”, government and government.

Hence there is a need to situate more properly the growing practices of civic engagement and deliberative processes in public deliberation within the political system and, more broadly,

society. And that is the aim of sketching a typology of civic engagement as a structural coupling between symbolic mediums of the political system, which is the distinction between government and governed. We shall in the following deepen our perspective by summing up a set of additional relevant elements of Luhmann's theory, namely his theory of the political system.

## **Deliberative Participation and the political system**

The calls for institutionalizing mini-publics and bestowing them with consultative or even decision-making powers is met with concern from politicians and commentators.<sup>48</sup> Among other things, they argue that non-elected citizens are not supposed to interact directly with or influence elected legislators in any formal manner because such constructs would transgress fundamental orders of the democratic structure.<sup>49</sup>

Again, our point is not about whether such a transgression of functionally differentiated systems is desired or undesired. Our point is merely about the observation of an imagined separation and its implication to civic engagement. And furthermore, that scaling up civic engagement to take on a formal role requires concepts to accommodate the irritation of the imagined separation. In that regard, the Luhmanese triadic concept of the political system may help us understanding some fundamental political challenges and concerns related to civic engagement.

The question is how institutionalized citizen panels, as a form of rooted extra-parliamentary political participation, fits into Luhmann's theory of the political system as a functional differentiation of politics, administration, the public, government, and opposition (government and governed). Furthermore, how could such practices be "normalized" though a structure coupling. What we are after is a notion of institutionalization as a permanent and normalized structural coupling rather than a temporary crisis-based measure.

For instance, Luhmann asks: "Corruption clearly has a pejorative meaning. One must, however, acknowledge that the issue is not simply the fight against corruption, the formulation of norms against corruption and their enforcement. The deeper question is, rather, which structural couplings in relation to other sub-systems can replace corruption and make it possible to reduce

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<sup>48</sup> <https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781786436641/introduction.xhtml>

<sup>49</sup> See Vincent Jacquet, Christoph Niessen, Min Reuchamps (2022): 'S'ortition, its advocates and its critics: An empirical analysis of citizens' and MPs' support for random selection as a democratic reform proposal', *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 43(2) 295–316; García-Espín, Patricia, Ganuza, Ernesto (2017): 'Participatory Skepticism: Ambivalence and Conflict in Popular Discourses of Participatory Democracy'. *Qualitative sociology*, 2017-10-03, Vol.40 (4), p.425-446.

and at the same time increase, with the help of structural coupling, the influence of the environment on the legal system”<sup>50</sup> For the system of law, Luhmann used the examples of the constitution and contract as institutionalized structural couplings of politics and law and economy and law, respectively.

An institutionalizing of citizen panels can be viewed in a similar manner as a “corruption” of communicative systems. The question then is which structural coupling can replace the political concerns (that see “corruption”) about installing non-elected citizens as an auxiliary but formal political basis next to elected legislators. How may the immediate irritation and thus complexity be reduced and thus enable the development of increased complexity? Because civic engagement does add complexity to the political system.

To be sure, a difference between corruption and civic engagement is of course that citizen panels are desired but corruption undesired. Yet some also find citizen panels and the structural coupling they embody and produce as undesirable. From their view, the coupling may look like unwanted corruption of the political system by undesired interference of unelected citizens. To be sure, from a social systems theory perspective, the term corruption takes on a descriptive use to describe the introduction of a code from one social system into another, viz. system irritation.

We may use this insight to reflect on how the innovative practices of deliberative participation may irritate the political system. Because the irritation is evident, as can be observed in the unsettled debates about the topic.

The way that systems solve such “irritation” is by means of a structural coupling that can replace the instant coding. That could be by invoking the code of law to render an undesired interference illegal. But it could also be by invoking the code of morality to frame it as a moral act. Or it could be by inventing a new code to enable system integration by putting it into order.

The concepts of “participatory democracy” and “citizen engagement” are examples of such attempts of recoding. Yet they are not entirely successful as regards creating the desired structural coupling.

We may here notice that these concepts derive their meaning from a system irritation between the political systems sub-systems, namely between the public, the government, the opposition, and the administration. The concepts would have been unnecessary if it had not been for that challenge. It’s the very crossing of well—established functional differentiation that made it necessary to coin the concept of “participatory democracy” and “citizen engagement.” Hence, we

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<sup>50</sup> (Niklas Luhmann (2009): *Law as a Social system*. Oxford University Press, p. 385

may view the debates and the academic literature as revolving around the challenge of structural coupling. An implicit reference to functional differentiation runs through all arguments and propositions.

In other words, it is the functional differentiation, irritation and challenge of structural coupling that makes the concepts relevant in the first place as well as constitutes its defining features.

## A typology of civic engagement

So far, we have identified four clusters of ordering principles, or *social distinctions*, of essential importance to a typology of civic engagement.

**Firstly**, a distinction between bottom-up engagement actions by ordinary citizens directed towards influencing some political outcome, and top-down civic engagement actions initiated and mandated by public authority. Co-created initiatives here qualify as top-down if a formal link to public authority is present. Additionally, it identifies a distinction between civic engagement activities that takes the form of mere consulting or non-binding advising, and activities where citizens have been granted a formal standing in relationship to policy-development.

**Secondly**, a distinction between civic engagement and civil society. Due to its defining link to public authority, civic engagement must be understood as belonging to the political system, as a top-down and, in principle, value-neutral activity, viz. a form or tool for engagement in the context of governance: a tool of governance. In comparison, civil society activities are bottom-up, value-driven, and have their own distinct function in society.

**Thirdly**, the formal recognition by and link to public authority as a *sine qua non* criteria for “civic engagement.” That link makes “civic engagement” stand apart from the broader set of practices forming the public sphere as well as various forms of civil society or private sector-based counseling and consulting. Without that defining link, we see merely a civil society activity.

**Fourthly**, a shift in the usual perspective on civic engagement based on the heterogenous concept of democracy to the much more organized concept of parliamentarianism to sketch out the societal context for civic engagement. It identifies three main distinctions that draws up the typology of parliament, namely 1) the distinction between government and opposition (inside parliament); 2) the distinction between parliament from administration (parliament versus its outside); and 3) the distinction between the political system composed by the parliament and administration from the public sphere (political system versus its outside)

This triadic division of the political system, we argue, forms the primary context for

conceptualizing civic engagement.

## **The helix-model vs. civic engagement**

To illustrate the peculiar public policy challenges related to constructing a typology of civic engagement, we shall in the following employ a further comparison with the triple helix model for innovation partnerships (developed to describe innovation-partnerships between science, government, and industry). The comparison serves to illustrate how civic engagement due to its structural coupling to public authority raises more complex questions than triple-helix partnerships.

### ***The helix-model: system preservation***

The triple helix model of innovation is conceptualized as three social systems (science, industry, political system) that interweave through a structural coupling around a common cause of societal growth. Metaphorically speaking, helix-models revolve their “DNA-strings” around innovation as a coding that places joint knowledge production at the core of the structural coupling. It’s a common cause, a joint problem-solving entity, a common rationality, which provides the social medium for the structural coupling of the participating systems.

The helix model comes out of system theory with its focus on communication as social systems. Hence the helix does not seek to represent any arms-length principle or integrity issues of organizations or individuals. It seeks to explain the organization of communication as the modus operandi of cooperation, and not whether, say, politics encroaches on scientific integrity.

The helix model is mainly presented as a typology, that is, an ideal-type concept for innovation cooperation. The simplicity of this model stems from the continuance of the structural separation of the involved social systems. It illustrates how different social fields co-exist without interfering with each other as such. The political system operates its structural coupling by coding its coupling as something external to the system itself. It is policy implementation, and it sits with the administrative branches. Issues related to policy and legislation is kept away from the helix; or it flows from the government to the helix, and not the other way around.

The helix-model metaphor of the DNA-strings illustrates to us how the social systems composing the helix remains separate. The respective social systems are not affected as such. Their social codings remain intact. The same applies to the expansion of the triple helix model to the “quadruple helix” to accommodate conceptually civil society. Adding the civil society component as a fourth DNA-string does not affect the other systems. It only adds a new form of communication to the DNA-structure.

That is comforting in view of the always-present concerns for “corrupt” mixings of the involved systems, e.g., politics or economy intruding on the “value-free” system of science.

It is important to understand that when two systems structurally couple, it’s not producing a third system. In the triple helix, several systems couple structurally through the medium of innovation, yet they stay separate, as illustrated by the metaphor of the DNA-helix strings. If the innovation partnerships between science, industry, political system would create an entire new social system, the DNA-helix would cease to be an appropriate metaphor.

### **Civic engagement: system change**

Whereas the helix-model for innovation places joint knowledge production at the core of its structural coupling, civic engagement places the production of policy and legislation at the core of the structural coupling. Whereas the helix-models depict structural separation of the involved systems, civic engagement is characterized by the political system “opening” itself to input from the outside (citizens) to operations related to policy and legislation that normally are strictly internal. Whereas the helix-models seeks to depict structural coupling in relation to a concrete innovation project, the concept of civic engagement denotes a structural coupling that affects the composition of the political system. It’s not about interactions and exchanges between systems but about an alteration of the structure of the political system by adding a new form of legitimate political representation.

Citizen engagement simply generates irritation across the internal functional differentiation of the political system as well as the distinction between the political system and its surroundings: 1) It irritates the differentiation between the political system and the public sphere; 2) It irritates the parliamentary differentiation between government and governed (opposition); 3) It irritates the parliamentary differentiation between legislators and administration, because if one of the sides of it will affect the differentiation.

The challenge of developing a typology of civic engagement is that we have several levels of distinctions related to the political system. Change one of them, for instance, the distinction between public and parliament, or between administration and the public, and you will alter the entire system. If we open the political system to civic engagement, this will alter fundamental structures of the political system. The social system that civic engagement links on to and is defined through will undergo a transformation at the same time this engagement form becomes reality.

Altogether, civic engagement as a form of a structural coupling between citizens and the political system presents us with structural challenges that by closer inspection appear way more

convoluted than couplings between systems where the involved systems in themselves remain unchanged (as is the case with the Helix-models). To explain the multi-layered systemic irritation triggered by civic engagement, the oft-used concept of “corruption” to describe a confusion of codes seems shorthanded. Because what is at stake is not only a confusion of codes but an alteration of the codings. From a system theory perspective, civic engagement is simply more complex. Fig. 1 below offers an overview over the differences between triple helix model and civic engagement.

## Civic engagement as a social system

The complexity of the ideal-type analysis of civic engagement as a tool of governance is mapped by the scheme in fig. 2, which contains an overview over the compacts of the *problem, medium, code, decision program and organization* of: 1) the social systems involved in the quadruple helix for innovation; 2) religion as social system (because in some European countries, civic engagement is requested to include religious communication as well); 3) the proposed compact of civic engagement.

Each of these compacts contain an ideal-typical analysis of functionally differentiated communication, viz. a typology. The scheme serves to illustrate how civic engagement fits into the functionally differentiated modern society by being situated in the political system. However, as illustrated by fig. 3, this causes challenges to the medium and codes of politics – challenges that needs to be reflected in a typology of civic engagement.

A main conclusion is thus that a typology of civic engagement cannot be understood as something separate from a typology of the political system. It's not a helix shaped relationship where functional domains entwines without merging or changing characters. Rather, it's a paradigmatic change to the political system.

Most social science analysis that takes an interest in dependencies and implications: if A changes, then how does that affect B? For instance, in our case, that the change starts at the level of decision programs (ideology) and then “shifts” other components of the compact. However, system theory does not provide for such sequential causalities. Rather, it views implications at the level of general understanding.

Fig. 3 offers additional comments to the compacts of politics and civic engagement understood as separate systems. However, the scheme also makes it clear that a concept of civic engagement that presupposes a formal link to public authority invites us to rethink the political system rather than insisting on a civic engagement as a separate category vis-à-vis the political system.

As the scheme and its comments indicate, a main difficulty with understanding civic engagement as a separate typology vis-à-vis the political system is that the implication of such activities brings changes to the political system as such. It is not possible to steer clear of these implications as the very concept of civic engagement, as we use it in this paper, involves a coupling that implicates such an alteration.

## Concluding reflections

This paper has presented a typology for civic engagement. To frame our enquiry, we distinguished civic engagement as a form of interface that *connects* citizens with public policy or public administration decision-making. The defining moment of civic engagement as a separate form of political engagement is the formal recognition and bestowment of political power. For the notion of civic engagement to make sense at all, a defining feature must be some sort of arrangement that sets “civic engagement” apart from the broader set of practices that form the public sphere and various forms of civil society or private sector-based counseling and consulting to public authorities. That is the kind of political engagement we have developed a typology for.

The critical issue related to civic engagement is that it requires a fundamental change to established systems of political representation: either we see the formal recognition and bestowment of political power, or we don't. Either we see civic engagement, or we don't. If we see civic engagement, we see it because it sticks out. And by closer inspection, we see it stick out because of implication to the political system as a social system. The communication about civic engagement sticks out as a distinct practice with its own problem, symbolically generalized medium, code, decision program and organization. It bears implication to our common understanding of what we speak about, when we speak about civic engagement

The change happens at the level of the political system where the code of parliamentary politics suddenly encounters a new power base. Such an opening of the political system and the inclusion of new forms of political representation not only implicates an amendment of the conventional parliamentary distinctions between public/parliament. It also affects the divisions between government and opposition/parliament. Because if the public is brought inside the political system, it gains a seat of power in relationship to both the opposition, the parliament, the administration...and the public – in which sense the public paradoxically gains a seat of power in relationship to the public. However, the code through which this “seat” is observed is not power as majority/minority (inclusion/exclusion) but more or less consensus, and this shift in code a deparadoxification of the at first glance paradoxical circular relationship.



This is of course always a matter of scale – ranging from the fictional situation of a full scale sortition based second chamber with legislative power on par with parliamentarians to more informal consultations. However, according to our typology, even a modest public authority mandate instantly places activities in the category of civic engagement.

To be sure, there is a revolutionary element to social movements arguing for civic engagement. And if realized, that element will change the political system rather than instituting a new and isolated aspect of the political system. Since the entire political system is built around parliamentarism as a form of representation, a change to the system of representation implicates a change to the political system as such.

And this is the paradox of our typology of civic engagement: the typology has been built by observing civic engagement from the perspective of parliamentarism as an ideal-type. But as soon as the typology of civic engagement become a reality, it erodes the social system it is built on and hence the typology loses its structural foundation.

This “theoretical complexity” of the typology of civic engagement is no abstraction. It’s a concrete and observable reality in the communication about civic engagement. It translates into political confusion and reservations about civic engagement. It may explain why something mostly considered a good idea by closer inspection appears too complex to handle politically, and therefore end up shelved, sidelined, or is kept at an arm’s length from the political system as civil society activities.

It must be emphasized that the issue related to social systems is not about the ability of professionals and non-professional to engage in fruitful discussions, although academic studies points at a clear challenge in communication in relation to civic engagement practices.<sup>51</sup> However, professionalized language that sometimes can be hardly understandable to outsider is product of a functional differentiation that enables the build-up of complex system-internal differentiation. But these challenges are different from the irritation arising from the clash of codes.

Finally, in relation to ISEED’s objective regarding the identification of the conditions in which active participation of citizens in public debate and knowledge production contributes to legitimate decision-making in democratic societies, the typology identifies and clarifies fundamental issue related to civic engagement and legitimate decision-making. To be sure, political skepticism stemming from an enduring confusion about the idea and role of civic engagement stands as an enduring roadblock to initiating and scaling up citizen engagement. By

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<sup>51</sup> Koen P. R. Bartels (2016): *Communicative Capacity: Public Encounters in Participatory Theory and Practice*. Bristol: Polity Press.

developing a typology that articulates the place and role of citizen engagement in the larger field of the political system, it contributes to ISEED's overall ambition of developing a new conceptual approach to the understanding of the role and value of citizen participation in institutional decision-making.

## **Deliverable D2.1 in the ISEED context**

The typology of civic engagement speaks directly to ISEEDs overall ambition to developing a new conceptual approach to understand the role and value of citizen participation in institutional decision-making.

It also speaks to the ambition of identifying generalizable characteristics and conditions that cultivate active and productive citizen participation in public deliberation.

Conceptually, the typology here offers a theoretical perspective that allows ISEED to relate specific traits of engagement practices with different types of aims and intended impacts of civic engagement.

Methodologically, the typology is a useful tool towards constructing a novel concept of 'deliberative participation' designed to enhance both the quality and the legitimacy of political decision-making.

**FIGURE 1 – 3**

Fig. 1			
	<b>Triple Helix</b>	<b>Civic engagement</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>Problem solving</b>	Economic and societal growth	Democratic representation	Innovation seeks technological solutions to societal problems by producing knowledge-based technology.
<b>Outcome</b>	Knowledge	Policy	Civic engagement seeks to remedy an alleged problem regarding democratic representation and produces policy.
<b>Link to political system</b>	Implementation , one-way	Policy making, two-way	Innovation partnerships is about implementing government policy reg. innovation.  Civic engagement has a policy making dimension and thus links on to public policy making, viz. public authority.
<b>Relation between involved social systems</b>	System separation	System integration	In triple (or quadruple) helix partnerships, the entwining of communication does not change the fundamental composition of the participating social systems. They remain separate.  Civic engagement is defined by a structural coupling that merges citizens into the political system/ the parliamentary structure.
<b>Affects the structure of the political system</b>	No	Yes	Civic engagement implies changes to the political system caused by an alteration of the structure of representation, which affects all distinctions involves in the triadic division of the political system.
<b>Age of problem</b>	New (“innovation”)	Old (“government”)	Innovation is a very recent thematic area. The problem of democratic representation is as old as the idea of democracy itself.
<b>Typology complexity</b>	Simple	Complex	The triple helix as a typology for innovation partnership is simple because it builds on existing and unaltered social systems. Civic engagement presents us with a system changing quality that needs to be reflected in a typology.
<b>Metaphor complexity</b>	Simple	Complex	The triple helix is a simple metaphor because the DNA-string do not merge or affects each other. Its static image.  A metaphor for civic engagement would be much more complex because its components merge and affects each other, which would require an illustration of dynamic relationships.

Fig. 2	Quadruple Helix				Civic engagement	Comments
<b>Functional system</b>	Science	Economy	Civil society	Politics	Politics	
<b>Structural dimension</b>						

<b>Problem</b>	Scarcity of knowledge	Scarcity of goods and services	The organisation of joint, collective action in a voluntary and “for the common good”	How to arrive at legally binding decisions for all in society	How to arrive at legally binding decisions for all in society	The problem of
<b>Symbolically Generalised medium</b>	Truth	Money	Values	Power	Consensus	
<b>Code</b>	Truth/non-truth	Paying/non-paying	Values (for the observer: value-laden)	Majority/minority	Consensus / non-consensus	
<b>Decision programmes</b>	Theory i.g. Kuhn	i.g. Keynesianism	e.g. climate movements, sport-clubs, etc.	Parliamentarism with conventional competitive representation	Parliamentarism w. Participatory democracy	
<b>Organisation</b>	Scientific communities	Market	Voluntary	Parliamentarism	Parliamentarism plus civic engagement	

<b>Fig. 3</b>			
	<b>Politics</b>	<b>Civic Engagement</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>Problem</b>	How to arrive at legally binding decisions for all in society	How to arrive at legally binding decisions for all in society	The problem civic engagement seeks to solve is equal to politics as a social system.
<b>Symbolically Generalised medium</b>	Power	Power	The production of legally binding decision is about power, and power thus remains the medium of civic engagement.  However, due to the consensus seeking code of civic engagement compared to the election-competitive code of minority/majority, or inclusion/exclusion, the concept of power must be understood different in civic engagement.
<b>Code</b>	Majority/minority	Consensus/non-consensus	The purpose of civic engagement is to solve the problem of how to arrive at legally binding decisions for all in society by changing the foundation of legitimate decisions from the power-centric focus of majority/minority (acceptance of decisions) to a consensus-based decision-making paradigm. Hence civic engagement as a social system observes its operations and surroundings through the code of “consensus/non-consensus”
<b>Decision programmes Political ideology</b>	Parliamentarism with conventional representation	Parliamentarism w. Participatory democracy	For most European countries, the ideological basis of the political systems remains social democracy with its core of parliamentarism: Parliamentarism stands as the substructure of the political system but can also be considered as an ideological construct – hence the difference between parliament as organization and parliamentarians as ideology.
<b>Organisation</b>	Parliament	Parliament+	The paradigmatic figure that expresses civic engagement in its purest form is the sortition based second chamber model, which simply adds a new organizational construct to the conventional parliamentary model.

## **ANNEX to D3.3 - Barriers to Impact of Citizen Engagement**

### **Introduction**

Citizen engagement enjoys increasing popularity in the political discourse and among academics and civil society advocates. In recent year, the EU has scaled up its stated ambitions in the area. Several European governments have demonstrated a willingness to experiment with participatory processes as auxiliary to parliamentary politics. The European Union research and innovation programs route increasing streams of funding to stimulate such processes. Citizen engagement is promoted as a crucial remedy to the current crisis of democracy, as many citizens feel ever more alienated from and distrustful of their political representatives and the political system more generally.

Yet what to many seems like a highly promising idea remains embryonic in the wider public policy context. “Engagement practitioners” – those who promote, design, and implement engagement processes – report significant difficulties with mobilizing support and finances for concrete initiatives and achieving a role in and impact on public policy work cycles.

To understand this gap between the promise and the performance of citizen engagement, this paper identifies several “barriers” to maturing the agenda. By barriers we mean issues and factors that engagement practitioners and experts identify as hampering uptake of practical engagement initiatives and processes as well as the advancement of the agenda more generally. The focus is thus limited to barriers identified by engagement practitioners and academics as preventing citizen engagement from having an impact, in a wide sense. It does not consider citizens’ perspectives or public authority stakeholder perspectives.

The paper is developed as an empirically grounded think-paper to stimulate debate and reflection across all relevant stakeholders. It draws on interviews with key engagement practitioners and experts across Europe to capture a perspective “from the field”.

## Methodology

The mapping of barriers to the impact of citizen engagement undertaken in this paper has benefitted from the collaboration of the Danish Board of Technology's extensive network of experts and practitioners in the field of citizen engagement. We first undertook a review of the existing academic and non-academic literature on citizen engagement (CE) and impact and evaluation of CE processes to gain an overview of the existing knowledge. We then conducted 11 semi-structured interviews with key experts and practitioners mainly focused on their own personal experiences of barriers to impact of CE processes, as well as their wider reflections on systematic impediments in the field. These interviews were subsequently transcribed using transcription software and coded, the results of which are included here for reference in the form of a "Methodological Appendix". From these interviews, we formulated a list of barriers identified by one or more of the interviewees. The interviewees and other external experts were then invited to a workshop in Copenhagen on 4-5 October 2022 for the purpose of discussing and validating the barriers identified in the paper and a broader discussion of challenges for CE processes, after which the paper was revised.

The report takes the form of a set of reconstructions of experiences and perspectives offered by interviewees, exemplified with references to statements from the interviews. Even though barriers to CE are often fairly context-specific, some noticeable general issues were reported by interviewees. In general, the major barriers across various contexts of citizen engagement appeared to be of a *political* character: Concerns raised by interviewees were less about issues related to methodologies for process facilitation. Indeed, the engagement practitioners generally believe they have a relatively well-equipped and well-tested toolbox. Rather, the barriers they experience are mostly related to such difficulties as communicating the aims and purposes of citizen engagement and mobilizing sufficient support and finances from political representatives and administrations. Accordingly, these issues will also be emphasized by this paper.

A small caveat: The issues raised by interviewees are highly interconnected. As such, it may seem misguided to divide them into separate categories. For instance, the lack of knowledge of the aims and modalities of engagement processes in political systems and society more generally surely is a cross-cutting issue that lie beneath practically all the considered barriers. However, for the purpose of organizing the paper and subsequent debates, topics and issues have been grouped into categories that are, we argue, nonetheless conceptually distinct, and which often hold different lessons for the practitioner community to overcome barriers to impact of citizen engagement.

Above and beyond the epistemic value of empirically mapping the barriers identified in this paper, the purpose of the paper is to instigate reflections and discussion among all relevant stakeholders, experts and practitioners, in the wider citizen engagement community, and it is in this spirit that we put them forth.

## Review of the Existing Literature

The scientific literature on citizen engagement is abundant and sprawling – and to some extent conceptually unsystematic. This may be a consequence of the fact that the engagement literature, arguably, has two different roots.

One root points to the political theory literature on deliberative democracy, where discussions are often pitched at a relatively high level of abstraction.<sup>52</sup> In this body of work, democracy is conceived as fundamentally a forum of public reason, where legitimate laws should ultimately be anchored in citizens' free exchange of arguments and reasons.

The other root points to empirical studies and reflections on practice, in which a range of cross-cutting and partly overlapping concepts have been proposed and defended to order and analyze actual practices of citizen engagement.<sup>53</sup> In this literature, "citizen engagement" is sometimes clearly differentiated form, and sometimes used interchangeably with related concepts such as "discursive participation", "public engagement", "citizen participation", "civic engagement", and so forth. What is clear, however, is that citizen engagement is consistently conceptualized as a deliberative practice that seeks to include citizens in one or several different points of the political decision-making process.

Some of these empirical studies have considered barriers to the impact or uptake of citizen engagement processes – albeit often only indirectly. In a classic 1977 study, written from the perspective of the public administrator, Stephen Cupps highlights not only the "potential short-sightedness of political responses to the citizen participation movement" as a problem

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<sup>52</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*; Habermas and Rehg, *Between Facts and Norms*; Bohman and Rehg, *Deliberative Democracy*; Gutmann and Thompson, *Why Deliberative Democracy?*

<sup>53</sup> Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs, 'PUBLIC DELIBERATION, DISCURSIVE PARTICIPATION, AND CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT'.

associated with the growth of engagement initiatives, but also the distinctive problems of “representation and legitimacy”. According to Cupps, the public official must be wary of uncritically accepting the claims of citizen engagement groups to represent the public interest, lest they “add to the crisis of legitimacy and authority affecting all of our political institutions”.<sup>54</sup>

This normative sentiment has recently been echoed from the political theory side by Christina Lafont, who warns against the “blind deference” to randomly selected others in various mini-publics that “lottocratic conceptions of deliberative democracy” expect citizens to accept.<sup>55</sup>

Other studies have pointed to “participatory skepticism” – “defined as the set of discourses of doubt and low expectations towards participatory democracy” – as a serious obstacle to efficacious engagement processes. Such participatory skepticism – which implies that even in the case when engagement practices are “accepted in normative terms”, they are “not seen as a convincing practical alternative” to the institutions of representative democracy – can be fueled by such factors as an expectation of low political efficacy and “horizontal distrust” of co-citizens.<sup>56</sup>

In the study that is perhaps most clearly relevant to our undertaking in this paper, Mario Ianniello, Silvia Iacuzzi, Paolo Fedele and Luca Brusati compose a “systematic review of the English-language empirical literature about citizen participation to identify the obstacles to its implementation and the most successful ways to address them”. They identify three categories of obstacles, where the first is broadly congruent with the problem discussed by Cupps: (1) “contextual factors, such as information deficit and asymmetries as well as the attitude of public officials”; (2) “organizational arrangements, in particular community representation criteria and process design”, and (3) process management patterns, including group dynamics and collaboration quality”.<sup>57</sup>

Finally, the present study must take into account the extent to which democracy itself is increasingly perceived in a rapidly growing literature to be in crisis across the Western world. This diagnostic literature – whether it speaks in terms of “democratic deconsolidation” or possibly the

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<sup>54</sup> Cupps, ‘Emerging Problems of Citizen Participation’.

<sup>55</sup> Lafont, *Democracy without Shortcuts*.

<sup>56</sup> García-Espín and Ganuza, ‘Participatory Skepticism’.

<sup>57</sup> Ianniello et al., ‘Obstacles and Solutions on the Ladder of Citizen Participation’.



very “end of democracy”<sup>58</sup> – represents the background for the current surge in interest around citizen engagement, as a possible means to address democracy’s perceived legitimacy gaps or even what some have called a full-blown legitimacy crisis.<sup>59</sup>

In what follows, we occasionally rely upon this body of literature for purposes of interpreting or contextualizing the material. However, as the purpose of this study is to foreground the interviewees’ own experiences with barriers to impact of citizen engagement, the theoretical material and the findings of previous studies are intentionally kept in the background.

## Mapping Barriers to Citizen Engagement

The interviews disclose several key barriers that practitioners and experts identify as preventing the establishment of a more enabling political and institutional environment for citizen engagement achieving an impact. These barriers can be grouped into nine general categories: (1) a conceptual barrier, (2) a legitimacy barrier, (3) an integration barrier, (4) an incentives barrier, (5) a funding barrier, (6) an evaluation barrier, (7) a politization barrier, (8) a moral high ground barrier, and (9) a reification barrier. In what follows, we outline and briefly discuss each of these barriers under more intuitive headings that comprise direct quotes from the interviews.

### “A lack of understanding of what this agenda can do”

*The conceptual barrier* refers to how advocates and engagement practitioners repeatedly encounter a lack of a fundamental knowledge and understanding among key stakeholders and society more generally of CE formats and purposes. Interviewees report that the most difficult challenge for the promotion and initiation of civic engagement processes is the general lack of understanding of the fundamental idea of civic engagement and its aims and purposes. To many, the difference between civil society engagement and citizen engagement remains unclear. In the eyes of many politicians, civil servants, media as well as citizens, citizen engagement appears to be a democratic innovation, which they do not fully understand the meaning and legitimacy of – if at all. At the same time, civic engagement appears politically complex and often raises fundamental

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<sup>58</sup> Foa and Mounk, ‘The Democratic Disconnect’; Runciman, *How Democracy Ends*; Levitsky and Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die*.

<sup>59</sup> Ibsen, ‘The Populist Conjuncture’.

questions of democratic representation, power, and legitimacy (as we discuss below). And where some understanding has been established, it typically remains unclear what it takes to deliver high quality participatory processes.

The conceptual confusion surrounding citizen engagement appears to be a cross-cutting challenge that interviewees describe as potentially affecting all phases and aspects of engagement processes – from funding, stakeholder buy-in, and press coverage to the balancing of the expectations of participants. Accordingly, one interviewee reported a basic “lack of understanding of what this agenda can do” (Interview 1); another emphasized that “it is not well understood and it’s not supported as an add-on to representative democracy” (Interview 4); a third maintained that “it’s difficult to explain these things in a nutshell” (Interview 6); while a fourth noted that “the lack of understanding, the lack of knowledge and experience ... you find both in the political system and with citizens and so on” (Interview 10).

Without a clear and shared idea of the purpose and place of civic engagement in the political system, initiatives must continuously invent political narratives to explain the aims and purposes and establish legitimacy. This poses some additional challenges to engagement practitioners. If they wish for their CE practices and efforts to have an impact, they need to master not only the practical and methodological skills of convening engagement processes, but also, just as importantly, the complex art of political communication and “lobbyism”.

### **“It’s the question of legitimacy; it’s the question of power”**

*The legitimacy barrier* refers to several interviewees’ experience of often encountering, even where there is no lack of understanding of CE practices, a skeptical attitude towards key elements of CE from a normative point of view – and thus the question of the political legitimacy of CE. Politicians may question why they, as elected representatives, should receive input from CE processes, when they already enjoy the democratic legitimacy derived from their success in electoral contests. For example, one interviewee reported that the spokesperson of a governing party, who had mandated a CE process, frankly admitted that “we don’t care about it” (Interview 4). Moreover, public officials may question why they should engage with non-experts on complex public policy matters and insist that “we have all the competency we need within these four walls – why should we go out and listen to these uneducated people”? (Interview 6)

Another reported issue is that the engagement communities' focus on parliamentary recognition and public authority fails to consider properly the value in mobilizing civil society organizations including trade and industry branch organizations – organizations, which in important ways can contribute to endorsing and shoring up the legitimacy of political agendas and processes and attract the interest of politicians (Interview 6).

**“If we want to have an impact, we have to enter into other systems of society and play by their rules”**

*The integration barrier* refers to the general lack of integration of citizen engagement processes into the political system, including the public administration. Existing democratic political systems with their histories of parliamentarism and bureaucracy have not been designed or equipped to accommodate CE. Therefore, engagement processes are mostly set up “outside” formal organizational structures and remain and remain, for the most part, loosely anchored at both the political-representative and the administrative level. As one interviewee reports: “I think there’s a sense in which we can do participatory democracy really well, in the sense of how we engage citizens, but we haven’t thought about how it links up with either the public administration or communicate to broader stakeholders and publics”, and that “the whole system of bureaucracy has not been designed with participatory democracy” in mind (Interview 7). This challenge is often posed in the form a dilemma related to different degrees of institutionalization, as one interviewee suggests: “I think the trend in the literature is going towards how to institutionalize, but not so much thinking about the whole political context and what it actually means to institutionalize and what you gain from it and what you lose” (Interview 6).

Moreover, CE processes tend to be anchored and driven by enthusiastic pioneers inside political systems and administrations, making them highly vulnerable to personnel change. The lack of institutional framework and coordinated capacities means that CE initiatives and expertise tend to follow personal passions and enterprises rather than policy and organizational functions. This renders CE vulnerable to ebbs and flows in the tide of political priorities and human resources, including rotation of personnel and internal affairs of organizations.

This is expressed by one interviewee thus: “a lot of the time this is driven by enthusiastic pioneers and that could be a politician who really sees the value in this or it could be a civil servant or an external facilitator ... but these people don’t last forever, they move on or lose an election, and then oftentimes this becomes incredibly vulnerable” (Interview 3). This lack of integration represents a substantial challenge for CE practitioners, as another interviewee notes: “If we want

to have an impact, we have to enter into other systems of society and have to play on their field and by their rules and with their means” (Interview 4).

More often than not, public institutions do not have knowledgeable staff or procedures for CE. It may here be noticed how EU FP7 and EU Horizon funding drives a great deal of CE initiatives across Europe, but national buy-in lags behind. That means that the projects end when EU funding ends, and nothing tends to be left, as expressed by one interviewee: “So even some of the ... the EU programs horizon and these programs that sometimes support these processes they also often come in this kind of one-off form where there is a grant period and then funding disappears and then all this work has been set up and all these processes have been set up but if no one then steps into, kind of like if the local municipality of the government doesn’t so to speak, step in and replace the new funding, which almost never happens, then, then the kind of infrastructure disappears again” (Interview 3).

The lack of institutionalization also tends to create a timing issue regarding aligning CE properly with policy development, administrative agendas and other workstreams. Rather than being a part of initial budgeting and planning cycle, CE is mostly added downstream as a separate issue.

### **“Selling the process is probably the main challenge”**

What we have called *the incentives barrier* refers to the struggle for motivating key actors to invest time and resources in CE processes. As one interviewee reported, “selling the process is probably the main challenge at the beginning, and really making people understand ... why it could be an advantage for them too” (Interview 6). The barrier also applies across all stakeholders and participants. One interviewee thus reported that a specific engagement process “fell flat, because it didn’t connect to the really powerful policy actors ... and as long as we are not able to connect with them, we have a hard time (Interview 4). To be sure, the incentives barrier can often not be separated in practice from the other barriers regarding the lack of concepts, legitimacy, funding, etc., and sometimes stakeholders may express a direct interest in *not* engaging with CE processes. For example, according to one interviewee, politicians may fear that if they follow the recommendations of citizen assemblies or other CE processes, they run the political risk of having to publicly change their established views and statements, thus rendering them vulnerable to being called out as a “turncoat”, while political parties may fear “why anyone should join a party if you can have a say through the engagement process” (Interview 3).

### **“There is never money and personnel for really generating an impact”**

*The funding barrier* refers both to a general lack of funding for CE as such, but also, more specifically, to the lack of proper funding modalities that embrace the full cycle of the engagement process – from planning and implementation to evaluation as well as impact and knowledge generating activities and communication. On a general level, the uneven availability of funding modalities across local, national, and supranational levels for CE practices may represent a democratic problem, according to one interviewee: “If this type of democracy is dependent on resources, you will get richer democracies depending on how rich your community is” (Interview 9). Moreover, funders often regard CE as a kind of consultancy task where the contracting typically ends with the “delivery” of a report. The aftermath of CE processes is seldom if ever covered by the funding as an integrated part of the project, although this is typically the most important stage for generating impact. For example, post-action evaluation and the use of project output for strategic communication are underprioritized by both funders and applications, to the detriment of policy uptake and impact as well as knowledge and legitimacy building. According to one interviewee, “the focus is on implementing the core activity, and from a budgetary point of view, this is quite serious, since a proper execution of the post-process phase is costly. It’s a long haul, and long hauls require personnel funding, and this is a problem for generating an impact” (Interview 8). Regarding funding, one interviewee also indicated that the engagement community sometimes “hid the costs” of engagement processes and instead performed beyond salary in the hope of landing new projects (Interview 3). As a result, “purchasers” of CE may push back on projects proposals that reflect actual costs, further limiting the funding available for impact generation.

### **“The biggest challenge is always to do some kind of impact measurement”**

*The evaluation barrier* refers to the difficulty of measuring the results of engagement processes. As reported by one interviewee: “Well, I mean, the biggest challenge ... is always to do some kind of impact measurement, because it’s really really hard to do” (Interview 6). A problem here is that both the CE process and the output may be hard to assess and evaluate: “How do we balance this against other social inputs? That’s what public administrations have always had to do, and politicians ... and we’re adding in something new, which they don’t really know how to quantify or qualify” (Interview 7).

Going somewhat beyond the interviews, one might wonder whether the very ethos of CE may to some extent go against formulating “hard” quantifiable output. On the most general level, engagement processes are initiated to spur positive influence on democratic processes and strengthen the general legitimacy of democratic politics. Yes, such effects are difficult to put on formulae for the purpose of evaluation.

These challenges of measuring output/impact/influence are not specific to engagement processes. An entire academic literature has formed around the problem of measuring impact in relation to research-based policy recommendations, not least in the context of EU Horizon projects. To be sure, impact assessment would also require an examination of context specific drivers and momentums.

**“Society has become more polarized in recent years, and it’s not easy to have an open dialogue between citizens”**

*The politization barrier* refers to how citizen engagement, which in essence is a political party-neutral process, risks falling prey to the centrifugal forces of political politization. Advocates among practitioners, academics and politicians tend to belong to the government opposition or on the progressive leftist side of the political spectrum. Add to this the "revolutionary" element of CE directly or indirectly calling for a reshuffling of political power by empowering citizens and elevating their influence on par with elected politicians, and politization becomes an ever-present risk that practitioners must keep in mind. As expressed by one interviewee, “if you’re going to change existing political institutions, and sort of try to implement the shift and implement an assembly, which is given certain powers, then, I mean, obviously, if somebody is going to lose power in politics, you’re always running uphill” (Interview 6). While democratic politics across the West has been marked by polarization in recent years, the risk of politization is greater in countries with less consolidated democratic regimes. As one interviewee notes, “[a European country], according to many, is experiencing a democratic backslide in recent years, and society has become more and more polarized in recent years, and it’s not really easy ... to have an open dialogue between citizens” (Interview 5). Finally, as one interviewee expressed, CE practices may also have a potential for engaging constructively with “the populist discourse”: “I think actually that there’s work, really interesting work to be done, where you kind of work creatively with some of these discourses, in order that you can speak in the language of the populist, you can speak to those kinds of people who are feeling disenfranchised, and we do some of that work, but I think there is much more to be done” (Interview 7).

The politization barrier is also relevant in relation to the media, as the deliberative and dialogue-oriented thrust of citizen engagement is fundamentally at odds with the conflict-orientation of the mass media. Thus, one interviewee suggests, “you set up the debate and try to meet across and understand each other’s points of view and create a common foundation and rational arguments, and the like. But this is so far from the logic of journalism, where the objective is to highlight the conflict. These logics are somewhat at odds” (Interview 2). Another interviewee agrees: “I have never experienced that the media has taken upon itself to facilitate the dissemination of the process and citizens in constructive dialogue, not once”, and “it is frankly absurd that the media’s news criteria entail that when something, which is potentially conflictual, is treated in a way that isn’t conflictual, so we can try and find a solution, then it becomes uninteresting” (Interview 8).

### **“There is a tendency for people in this space to be a bit naïve, a bit utopian”**

What we have called *the moral high ground barrier* refers to the way in which the CE community sometime position themselves in opposition to political representatives and administrations who resist or seek to bypass CE practices. As one interviewee notes, “I think there is a naivety among many that somehow a good participatory process will cut through all of this ... and everyone will see its moral authority ... I think there is a kind of tendency for people in this space to be a bit naïve, a bit utopian” (Interview 7). Another interviewee expresses a similar concern, “it’s precisely the same in the interview material I have from Western Buddhists in Nepal, they have these conversion stories, these narratives of how they saw the light, and where I thought, it would be better if this attitude isn’t too prevalent in the CE community, preferably cooler analysis” (Interview 2). These attitudes risk contributing to an antagonistic environment, which may get fortified by CE practitioners and advocates driven by passion and ideology, who may feel that their personal sacrifices in the name of the good cause of democracy do not receive the warranted recognition.

**“There is real risk that [the drive to standardize] kills a lot of the innovation in the process”**

Reification refers to the ascription of simple value to an abstract concept – in this context, it’s about the oversimplification of complex issues. What we might call *the reification barrier* issues from the idea that it is possible to construct one-size-fits all tools and models of citizen engagements. While some interviewees express strong support for standardization (Interviews 8 and 9), several interviewees also insisted that engagement processes are always highly contextual and open-ended. As one interviewee suggests, “there’s a whole number of things which I think are dangerous in the drive to standardize. The reasons that people want to standardize are good, but there is a real risk that it actually kills a lot of the innovation in the process” (Interview 3). Another interviewee agrees: “The danger associated with a nascent institutionalization is that it ossifies in some form, where it becomes a mechanism and a set of rules and laws, rather than facilitating a deliberative culture” (Interview 2).

Another challenge related to the drive towards professionalization and the idea of CE as a technical area of governance is that CE proves to be highly person-dependent both when it comes to process facilitation and content. It is simply difficult to run efficient engagement processes without expert-knowledge on the topic of engagement. The engagement community’s focus on tools, matrixes and technical solutions thus risks overriding the essentially context- and topic-bound challenges of establishing engagement processes. Finally, the strong emphasis on a methodological toolbox may also come at the cost of the competences that are necessary for achieving an impact, such as communicative skills, a deep knowledge of the political and administrative systems, and a willingness and ability to engage in “lobbying” efforts on behalf of the CE process and its results.

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## Methodological Appendix

In the course of this study, we conducted 10 recorded interviews and 1 non-recorded interview. We used a very loose, semi-structured interview guide, but we repeatedly emphasized during the interviews that our ambition was to let interviewees disclose the experiences and concerns that were “top-of-mind” for them, so we strove to interfere as little as possible in the first part of the interview. After a while, we would ask questions about the following 7 thematic complexes (or general codes), if we felt like the interviewees had not covered the relevant issues on their own accord:

1. Systemic issues

2. Organization
3. Planning
4. Method
5. Funding
6. Implementation
7. Communication

In the course of the interviews, we formulated a list of 16 subcodes that helped us code and categorize statements in our subsequent analysis of the material. Each of these subcodes are listed below under their respective general codes:

1. Systemic issues
  - a. Different conceptions of democracy/legitimacy
  - b. Resistance from public officials or administrative systems
  - c. Incentives to engage
  - d. Polarization in the political system
2. Organization
  - a. One-off or more permanent forms of organization
  - b. Degree of institutionalization of citizen engagement
  - c. Attitudes within the citizen engagement community
3. Planning
  - a. Timing
4. Method
  - a. Standardization of citizen engagement practices
5. Funding
  - a. Funding for citizen engagement practices in general
  - b. Funding for impact phase specifically
6. Implementation
  - a. Evaluation of process and output of citizen engagement practices
7. Communication
  - a. Communication with the broader public
  - b. Communication with policy makers and public officials
  - c. Public relations or lobbying work
  - d. The media

These subcodes were used to code and categorize the material in the following displays for all 10 recorded interviews. Two interviews were conducted and transcribed in Danish and the quotes included in the main text of the paper have been translated on an ad hoc basis.

**Interview 1:**

Code	Subcode	Quotes
Systemic issues	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Different conceptions of democracy</li> <li>2. Resistance from public officials or administrative systems</li> <li>3. Incentives</li> <li>4. Polarization</li> </ol>	<p>[06:22 - 06:31]: But the problem comes with that, you know, that the ministries then plan whatever the question is,</p> <p>[06:31 - 06:41]: they just plan to have it, and it doesn't necessarily mean that it's the best thing actually to have the citizen consultation over that question.</p> <p>[14:28 - 14:34]: you know, there is no super huge understanding what actually participatory, you know, means and</p> <p>[14:34 - 14:41]: how you can involve citizens, etc, etc, etc. And even if you're involving public, most of the time</p> <p>[14:41 - 14:47]: you are involving, you know, people who are like stakeholders in the process. I mean, for example,</p> <p>[38:13 - 38:21]: or or or sound very smart, etc, etc, etc. So this is really frustrates, you know, when you are</p> <p>[38:21 - 38:29]: actually working and then trying to people to engage, you know, and politicians, as we already</p> <p>[38:29 - 38:34]: spoke, you know, citizens are sometimes disengaged for many reasons, politicians are disengaged.</p> <p>[40:42 - 40:51]: organize it differently. But for now, yeah, there are no incentive from systematic point in a good</p> <p>[40:51 - 40:56]: directions, there are just incentive to do that, not entirely understanding what we're actually</p>

		<p>[42:31 - 42:39]: absolutely, you know, infant learning stage, where they try to understand, you know, how the world [42:39 - 42:47]: works. And hopefully they will do and they will be impactful in the future.</p> <p>43:35 - 43:40]: you can break down, I mean, at the most general level, I mean, it really is a political issue that [43:40 - 43:48]: is, you know, conditioned by a lack of understanding what this agenda can do, but also [43:48 - 43:54]: combined with the usual power struggles in politics and a reluctance from the side of politicians [43:54 - 44:02]: to open up the space for anything that can kind of compromise them as the primary power holders, right.</p> <p>[51:44 - 51:51]: that there are not all the questions the citizens should actually be speaking about because [51:51 - 51:59]: they can make bad decisions and we don't want to do that so happen, you know? [51:59 - 52:07]: So, yeah, and they're using example as a Soviet Union because, you know, citizen power and citizen [52:07 - 52:14]: council and all this stuff, et cetera, et cetera. So sometimes that it's more like part of the</p>
<p>Organization</p>	<p>5. One-off or more permanent  6. Degree of institutionalization  7. Attitudes in the engagement community</p>	<p>[17:47 - 17:55]: a super bad event with a lot of people in it. But basically, this is probably another [17:55 - 18:08]: challenge which we have, that there is very little competence capacity in Lithuania of people who</p>

		<p>[18:08 - 18:16]: are actually could be said or people, organizations, whatever, who have some reasonable</p> <p>[18:19 - 18:26]: experience working with those practices</p> <p>[20:01 - 20:03]: so yeah, this is this is also a challenge, you know, that</p> <p>[20:04 - 20:11]: did in a way you have a quite, quite strong competition on this. And yeah, even on academic</p> <p>[20:11 - 20:17]: side, there is not not a lot of people who are working directly with this. So, so, in a way,</p> <p>[36:44 - 36:52]: actually, because all those things are called citizen engagement, citizen participation,</p> <p>[36:52 - 36:58]: like democracy, whatever, something, something, something. And actually, they do not look very good.</p> <p>[36:58 - 37:06]: And this gives a bad image for those things. For the future as well, you know, because basically,</p> <p>[38:48 - 38:54]: that. So yeah, those maybe would be the practical examples, which I experienced both from Knowledge</p> <p>[38:54 - 38:59]: Economy Forum, when we try to, you know, work on some issues with the ministry and within the</p> <p>[38:59 - 39:05]: ministry itself, you know, when I saw that people were just like, you know, both stakeholders, and</p> <p>[39:05 - 39:12]: actually ministry workers as well. They were like, like, no, no, no, we just we just need to do that,</p> <p>[39:12 - 39:19]: you know, yeah. So that's, it's kind of a, it's a problem with kind of lack of general standards</p>
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		<p>[39:19 - 39:26]: or something that that you can just, you can just call anything engagement and basically, yes. Yes.</p> <p>48:38 - 48:43]: we are playing a political game in the end of the day, even though we think we're not.</p> <p>[48:43 - 48:50]: So, yeah, that would be more helpful, you know, and sometimes more pragmatical in order to</p> <p>[48:51 - 48:56]: reach some of the people, to change their minds or et cetera, rather than just being, you know,</p> <p>[48:56 - 49:07]: divine democracy warrior or sort of like that. So probably this is one of the things</p> <p>[49:07 - 49:16]: which comes to that. Yeah. What else? I'm just thinking, you know.</p>
Planning	8. Timing	
Method	9. Standardization	
Funding	<p>10. Funding for CE processes in general</p> <p>11. Funding for impact phase specifically</p>	<p>[10:59 - 11:08]: So if you want to organize those, the only options, of course, you can fundraise,</p> <p>[11:08 - 11:18]: but that's not always, you know, a feasible solution as well, or you can do it on your own</p> <p>[12:19 - 12:24]: So I think this is one of the parts of the challenges, you know, that basically on the national level,</p> <p>[12:24 - 12:33]: there is no system or no incentives or no, you know, finance or whatever, how you put it to actually do that.</p>
Implementation	12. Evaluation	

Communication	13. Communication with public 14. Communication with policy makers and public officials 15. Public relations/"lobbying" work 16. The media	[44:17 - 44:27]: of lobbying this project into a place to get it, you know, a more formal place, but also to convince [44:27 - 44:36]: politicians and other stakeholders that there is something useful from a pragmatic point of view [44:36 - 44:45]: that also can, you know, bolster their ambitions to secure their political mandates and so on and so
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**Interview 2:**

Code	Subcode	Quotes
Systemic issues	1. Different conceptions of democracy 2. Resistance from public officials or administrative systems 3. Incentives 4. Polarization	[16:31 - 16:38]: Og så sidder man bare og tænker, okay, der er også noget forståelsesbarriere i hele det danske forskningssystem, [16:38 - 16:48]: som er håbløst bagefter i forhold til den forståelse, der gennem mange år har eksisteret og lært sig i det europæiske forskningssystem. [16:48 - 16:53]: Så de nationale niveauer er nogle gange bagud i forhold til det her.  [18:08 - 18:19]: Altså, der sker ting, men den samlede kulturelle retning på politikudvikling på nationalplæne er centralisering. [18:19 - 18:26]: Og det er et kæmpe problem. Og på en eller anden måde er den nogen gange lidt modsat på det kommunale plan, [18:26 - 18:35]: hvor de er blevet mere og mere åbne over.  [19:11 - 19:18]: Det ser man også i FN og nye andre steder. Så der er nogle barrierer på det nationale niveau,

		[19:18 - 19:27]: som handler om, at tingene bare er skruet mere sammen efter, hvordan det var i går.
Organization	<p>5. One-off or more permanent</p> <p>6. Degree of institutionalization</p> <p>7. Attitudes in the engagement community</p>	<p>[08:04 - 08:30]: Så kan man sige, at faren ved en begyndende institutionalisering er, at det stivner i en eller anden form, hvor det bliver til en mekanisme, som i stedet for regler og love,</p> <p>[08:30 - 08:36]: som fremskynder en deliberativ kultur.</p> <p>[08:36 - 08:49]: Så det, der egentlig er vigtigt, er at det bliver masseret ind i det hele politiske system, som en praksis, der varierer fra gang til gang.</p> <p>[12:24 - 12:33]: men at der er en risiko for, at borgerinddragende initiativer ligesom bliver spist op af nogle andre institutioner,</p> <p>[12:33 - 12:40]: eller på en eller anden måde, at der er nogen, der ligesom siger, nu tager vi den her dagsorden, og så mekaniserer vi den på en eller anden måde,</p> <p>[12:40 - 12:48]: og så bliver det til noget andet i processen. Og stivner i et eller andet mærkeligt format, ikke?</p> <p>[22:43 - 22:51]: Og så sad jeg og tænkte, det er præcis det samme interviewmateriale, jeg har fra vestlige buddhister i Nepal,</p> <p>[22:51 - 23:01]: som har de her conversion stories, som har de der narrativer om, hvornår de bliver omvendt, eller hvornår lyset gik op for dem,</p> <p>[23:01 - 23:11]: og hvor jeg tænkte, der må helst ikke være for meget af det i miljøet, der må godt være lidt mere kold analyse.</p>



Planning	8. Timing	
Method	9. Standardization	
Funding	10. Funding for CE processes in general 11. Funding for impact phase specifically	<p>[04:21 - 04:37]: Udfordringen lige nu er fundingsystemet, hvor der ikke rigtig er noget funding til at lave det i Joint Research Center. Der er meget lidt funding.</p> <p>[04:37 - 04:58]: Der er stigende funding inden for DG Kommunikation, men det bliver kanaliseret ud gennem nogle eventbureauer, som hyrer eksperter til som subcontractors, for at være mere optaget af at lave blockbuster events uden at bruge en rød rejse på scriptwriter.</p> <p>[04:58 - 05:05]: Altså, det er lidt den logik, vi er inde i nu. Det er det, vi kæmper med.</p> <p>[05:05 - 05:27]: Så der mangler simpelthen en forståelse for, hvad det egentlig kræver at levere kvalitetsinddragelse. Plus at der også er nogle aktører inde på markedet, som driver hårdt drift på deres status.</p> <p>[15:12 - 15:20]: Hvis fundingen bliver ved med at flyde fra EU-niveau, og man ikke får de nationale institutioner ombord,</p> <p>[15:20 - 15:30]: så kører vi ved det. Der er flere, der siger, at rigtig meget kører igennem rammeprogrammer og Horizon-bevillinger,</p> <p>[15:30 - 15:36]: og så når pengene stopper sig alt væk, så er det bare front, de driver videre til næste version.</p>
Implementation	12. Evaluation	<p>[42:03 - 42:22]: Ja, det behøver ikke at måle effekten på den deliberative kultur, men på den politiske debat. Jeg er enig, at man skal holde fast i, at det skal have en impact.</p>

		[42:22 - 42:34]: Men det handler bare om noget andet end at genskabe sig selv i højere potens. Så det skal have en funktion og et impact.
Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>13. Communication with public</li> <li>14. Communication with policy makers and public officials</li> <li>15. Public relations/"lobbying" work</li> <li>16. The media</li> </ul>	<p>[50:19 - 50:31]: Generelt er det nok bare for kompliceret for medierne at fatte alle de, fordi det er jo også de intentioner, der er i det, ikke?</p> <p>[50:31 - 50:50]: Man åbner debatten og prøver at mødes og forstå hinandens synspunkter og skabe et fælles grundlag og rationelle argumenter og sådan noget. Det ligger så langt fra journalistisk logik, hvor det bare gælder om at klaske konflikten så hurtigt op på en væg som overhovedet muligt.</p> <p>[50:50 - 50:58]: Altså faktisk kan man sige, at intentionen bag borgeren er den stik modsatte. Så der er nogle logikker, der går lidt på tværs.</p>

**Interview 3:**

Code	Subcode	Quotes
Systemic issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Different conceptions of democracy</li> <li>2. Resistance from public officials or administrative systems</li> <li>3. Incentives</li> <li>4. Polarization</li> </ul>	<p>[15:08 - 15:12]: like when she was working with the environment agency she realized the more she talked about</p> <p>[15:12 - 15:20]: citizen engagement the less they wanted to do it because she was very interested in the kind of</p> <p>[15:20 - 15:26]: transformative aspects of citizen engagement the way it's you know she completely shifts</p> <p>[15:26 - 15:31]: shifts perspectives it's completely unpredictable you never know what new exciting ideas you're</p> <p>[15:31 - 15:36]: going to get out of it it's almost untamable that's what for her that's what's excited her</p>

		<p>[15:36 - 15:42]: about citizen engagement but here she is dealing with an organization which is set up and run</p> <p>[15:42 - 15:50]: mainly by engineers and for them this unquantifiably chaotic thing she was describing</p> <p>[15:50 - 15:56]: was the complete opposite of what they wanted and so for them she had to actually devise when they</p> <p>[16:33 - 16:39]: for example might say we have all the competency we need within these four walls why would we go</p> <p>[16:39 - 16:44]: out and listen to these uneducated people we you know we know all about all there is to know about</p> <p>[16:44 - 16:51]: flood defense there we might need to kind of broaden what they view as expertise and frame</p> <p>[16:51 - 16:58]: public participation as another form of evidence that's added to their internal structures</p> <p>[20:21 - 20:27]: of course in all parties you have these the technocratic voices you say but we know best</p> <p>[20:27 - 20:32]: we've already we already know the answer or solutions or if we don't know the answer on solutions we</p> <p>[20:32 - 20:38]: have access to the best academics and the experts so what we need to do is talk to the public</p> <p>[20:38 - 20:45]: to tell them how clever we are and how we've made the right decision</p> <p>[33:10 - 33:14]: absolutely I think there's a real challenge as well with party parties in this I think there's</p> <p>[33:14 - 33:20]: a fear sometimes that this is going to why should anyone join the party if you can have a say through</p>
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		<p>[33:20 - 33:27]: the citizen engagement process um it's almost like they want some people who have more of a scarcity [33:27 - 33:32]: mentality they want to make it hard for citizens to affect change because it actually makes the [33:32 - 33:38]: party membership more valuable um and of course some politicians don't necessarily see public [33:38 - 33:44]: apathy as a bad thing it certainly makes it easier to make big decisions.</p> <p>35:34 - 35:40]: for me there is that also there I don't think the solution can be mandated from the top but there [35:40 - 35:46]: needs to be a genuine discussion that that the politicians both the opposition and the [35:46 - 35:55]: governing um parties feel that this benefits them they see a value um that they walk out of this with [35:55 - 36:02]: better knowledge better decisions you know less death threats whatever it is they um they want</p>
<p>Organization</p>	<p>5. One-off or more permanent  6. Degree of institutionalization  7. Attitudes in the engagement community</p>	<p>[07:29 - 07:37]: because a lot of the time this is driven by enthusiastic pioneers and that could be a politician [07:37 - 07:41]: who really sees the value in this or it could be a civil servant or it could be an external [07:41 - 07:48]: facilitator or someone who goes in and really evangelizes but these people don't last forever [07:48 - 07:56]: they move on, you lose an election and then oftentimes this becomes incredibly vulnerable</p>

		<p>[08:56 - 09:01]: it has to kind of have some grounding but if it's written down if there's clarity on why you're doing</p> <p>[09:01 - 09:07]: it it's with clarity on how it's done it's harder to just throw away than if it's all based on</p> <p>[09:07 - 09:13]: one or two individuals and their knowledge the second thing we've looked at a lot is the organization</p> <p>[13:25 - 13:31]: for it but especially if we're looking at the purpose of empowerment and trust and long-term</p> <p>[13:31 - 13:37]: legitimacy you know that one meeting that one citizens' assembly that one process isn't going</p> <p>[13:37 - 13:45]: to cut it on its own it's all about the long-term communication feeding back and we don't really</p> <p>[13:45 - 13:51]: resource that in most organizations we have staff there to run the meetings to write the report</p> <p>[13:52 - 13:56]: and then we really need to think about who's going to be communicating with these citizens</p> <p>[13:56 - 14:03]: of these participants around the process for the next year or two years or three years if we're</p> <p>[14:03 - 14:10]: serious about you know long-term legitimacy and trust so i guess that's another area and then you</p> <p>17:26 - 17:33]: use of internally and so I think the barriers can look very differently depending on what type of</p> <p>[17:33 - 17:40]: what type of organization you're looking at and of course not to forget usually within an</p> <p>[31:17 - 31:23]: and interested in hearing about now I do see some value in these kind of attempts to create more</p>
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		<p>[31:23 - 31:30]: permanent deliberative processes like in Paris or where the citizens can raise issues and force the</p> <p>[31:30 - 31:34]: politicians to debate them I mean that to me feels like something which would be quite valuable it</p> <p>[31:34 - 31:42]: brings up issues but ultimately um I don't think any of those structures have had to have any power</p> <p>[31:42 - 31:50]: to force the politicians to do more than debate things.</p> <p>[47:06 - 47:13]: but yeah I think um but ultimately I mean it's we talk a lot about making this less person</p> <p>[47:13 - 47:18]: dependent um and it's really hard when you're dealing with something like the local authority</p> <p>[47:18 - 47:23]: which is so small because how can it not be person dependent because you don't have</p> <p>[47:23 - 47:29]: uh you don't you cannot have a big department with dozens of people working on this you have</p> <p>[47:29 - 47:35]: you have to rely on being able to find good people who um network well and work well</p>
<p>Planning</p>	<p>8. Timing</p>	<p>[10:07 - 10:19]: that's another barrier we've certainly seen one key barrier is around timing most of the time</p> <p>[10:19 - 10:24]: people said we really should have started this process much much earlier people sort of realize</p> <p>[10:24 - 10:30]: when the conflict is about to erupt that this is where we need we need to do citizen engagement</p> <p>[11:47 - 11:51]: heaven knows we've seen plenty of things happen the last couple of years that no one had</p>

		<p>[11:51 - 11:57]: predicted that no one could prepare for and you have to adapt but at least you you're planning</p> <p>[11:57 - 12:03]: ahead you if you're going to if you're going to do like a major restructuring or you're going to be</p> <p>[12:03 - 12:09]: setting your agenda to agenda 2030 targets if you talk about it a year in advance you've at</p> <p>[12:09 - 12:17]: least given yourself the time to create a process which can go a bit deeper so these are some of</p> <p>what I'm just saying that it</p> <p>[41:53 - 42:01]: takes a long time if you're doing politics usually to prepare policy work streams but it doesn't seem</p> <p>[42:01 - 42:07]: that we have that same attitude in the engagement coming into that it really takes a lot of time to</p> <p>[42:07 - 42:15]: prepare a process and this is again about money and costs because this will you know really create</p> <p>[42:16 - 42:26]: a more expensive process</p> <p>[45:56 - 46:02]: um of course this is for example participatory budgeting is helped for example a lot by the</p> <p>[46:02 - 46:07]: fact that it is an annual cycle you have you have to plan it you have to think through it</p> <p>[46:09 - 46:16]: and so having something a similar obviously it can't be as rigid a structure for say</p> <p>[46:16 - 46:21]: deliberative processes</p>
Method	9. Standardization	<p>[27:39 - 27:44]: you can of course experiment and stretch things but if you want to run a one-day event</p> <p>[27:44 - 27:49]: with a group of 100 people there are other methodologies that exist to do that you don't</p>

		<p>[27:49 - 27:54]: you don't take a word which actually means something very different and adapt it just</p> <p>[27:54 - 27:59]: because it sounds good just because it makes you look i mean so there i think there is a role and I</p> <p>[29:39 - 29:44]: so there's a whole number of things which i think are dangerous in the drive the reason</p> <p>[29:44 - 29:50]: why people want to standardize and legislate are good but there is there is a real risk that it</p> <p>[29:50 - 29:57]: actually kills a lot of the innovation in the process and fundamentally it's like this the</p> <p>[39:43 - 39:47]: know I wouldn't say tools are meaningless I think they can be very helpful for people to get their</p> <p>[39:47 - 39:55]: heads around it but i think they can also become the point where they stymie innovation they</p> <p>[39:55 - 40:05]: stymie change i don't say tools are useless at all</p> <p>[48:06 - 48:11]: and I think that is a real problem as you said asking not just thinking we need to have the</p> <p>[48:11 - 48:16]: technical experts there to talk about talk at the events and give evidence we also need them in the</p> <p>[48:16 - 48:21]: report writing uh we need maybe some of the competent people who usually write policy reports</p> <p>[48:21 - 48:26]: or the decision makers to look through it to make sure that it it's written in a way which is</p> <p>[48:26 - 48:33]: actionable and clear and also a lot of the times when people at the end of the process it</p>
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<p>Funding</p>	<p>10. Funding for CE processes in general  11. Funding for impact phase specifically</p>	<p>[48:50 - 48:56]: the whole thing but i sometimes i think when we started when people started doing this  [48:56 - 49:06]: certainly in the UK they sometimes hid the costs in the 90s and 2000s like they they'd scrounge the  [49:06 - 49:11]: budget from somewhere a lot of people would put time in for free or you know people would  [49:11 - 49:16]: put time in for free or you know people who weren't supposed to be working would work on it and I think  [49:16 - 49:22]: it's led to people decision makers thinking that this is cheaper than it is yeah like a lot of the  [49:22 - 49:28]: lot of the good stuff that has to happen is hidden from them and therefore there is a view that you  [49:28 - 49:34]: can do this last minute and with a very low budget and you can get good results so i think part of  [49:34 - 49:41]: the story there is to say well actually look this is this is not for every issue this is a  [49:41 - 49:46]: relatively expensive time consuming complicated process which can give much better results than  [49:46 - 49:53]: other processes in certain circumstances but it's certainly I don't think a process that we'd  [49:53 - 50:01]: advocate for everything and certainly not you know the same process for everything</p> <p>[56:08 - 56:19]: is needed to help people with transition I think that I mean one way of overcome them is to  [56:19 - 56:24]: demand more you know burden sharing financial costs from the European side so you need to  [56:24 - 56:29]: have partners that actually have you know a horse in the race and not just free riding on someone</p>
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		<p>[56:29 - 56:35]: else's budget because we all want something for free don't we and but as soon as you pay i mean</p> <p>[56:41 - 56:46]: get a responsibility that the things that you are building are actually kind of sustainable and</p> <p>[56:46 - 56:52]: will stay there after for instance for us funding ends right so it forces you to think when you're</p> <p>[56:52 - 56:56]: designing your principles hang on you're paying this much already and we're going to keep if</p> <p>[56:56 - 57:01]: we're going to keep doing this after the project is this actually a reasonable level to put it up</p>
Implementation	12. Evaluation	
Communication	<p>13. Communication with public</p> <p>14. Communication with policy makers and public officials</p> <p>15. Public relations/"lobbying" work</p> <p>16. The media</p>	<p>[20:45 - 20:52]: there is a fundamental problem in our political culture which is um all politicians want to listen</p> <p>[20:53 - 20:57]: at least they say they do it's everyone all politicians want to go out and listen but no</p> <p>[20:57 - 21:03]: one wants to ever admit they've changed their mind because we've got this the term turncoat</p> <p>[21:03 - 21:07]: in English and cap then that I am Swedish and I'm sure you have a similar thing in Danish</p> <p>[21:07 - 21:12]: that any politician who ever admits that I you know what I was wrong before I've changed my mind</p> <p>[21:12 - 21:17]: it's a fundamental sign of weakness and that is a real problem when you're doing citizen engagement</p> <p>[21:17 - 21:22]: because somehow there needs to be the possibility of actually changing your mind otherwise there's</p> <p>[21:22 - 21:29]: no point in engaging but if we're never going to admit that we changed our mind then we're going to</p>

		<p>[48:33 - 48:38]: becomes clear that will this follow-up communication needs to be handled by the communications</p> <p>[48:38 - 48:44]: department they've they haven't been looped into this until the very end and then they're</p> <p>[48:44 - 48:50]: job would be much easier if they'd been involved from the start to um to think through and structure</p>
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**Interview 4:**

Code	Subcode	Quotes
Systemic issues	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Different conceptions of democracy</li> <li>2. Resistance from public officials or administrative systems</li> <li>3. Incentives</li> <li>4. Polarization</li> </ol>	<p>[18:02 - 18:15]: What we see, what the main obstacle I think is the relationship to representative democracy and to people who are in power and connecting it to the mechanisms how things are done.</p> <p>[22:29 - 22:54]: The, the spokesperson of the ruling party said, we don't give a shit about it. We don't have any mandate, we are the ones who have demanded and we don't care about it, you know, so I think it's the question of legitimacy, it's the question of power.</p> <p>[26:33 - 26:45]: And I think this is the problem with all the problems we are facing like climate change, the system is stable enough to continue but it is not responsive to address the topics.</p> <p>[26:45 - 26:54]: And that's the reason why we have the citizen assemblies, because people think these topics are not properly addressed, we need to address them differently.</p> <p>[26:54 - 27:14]: But then there is this mismatch between this old system, which</p>

		<p>is kind of functional but also kind of dysfunctional and it doesn't work at the old system is still strong enough that it can block change.</p> <p>[32:28 - 32:49]: It's not well understood and it's not supported as an add-on to representative democracy, or as a kind of deliberative democracy to reform and to enhance democracy, because there's the strong understanding is representative democracy is what we have,</p> <p>[32:49 - 32:58]: and any critical for each one representative democracy might bring us back into an authoritarian regime.</p> <p>[38:53 - 39:03]: So we, we have, we have 2 million inhabitants, then you have four of these participatory experiments, which is nothing it's just a drop on the hot stone.</p> <p>[39:22 - 39:42]: always social democrats. So, there is this, this corpus of the city's administration, which is like a well-oiled functional oil machine and to know how to do things, and they don't want to have any cities participation, or because it's always, you</p> <p>[39:42 - 40:04]: know, you do it for the citizens, never with citizens. So for instance to give you an another example. They say that the energy provider which is city owned says, Okay, we are going to, to build on your house photovoltaic things, and we will rent</p> <p>[40:04 - 40:12]: your, your, your rooftop. They have been saying this for two years, three years.</p> <p>[40:12 - 40:24]: And they hired two people to do this for a city of 2 million</p>
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		<p>inhabitants so it's too little too few with two little people, not well funded.</p> <p>[40:24 - 40:28]: So, I think.</p> <p>[40:28 - 40:43]: Yes, there might be. There might be some people who want to change things, but the system is totally against them. So why is the system against the water what do you think happens.</p> <p>[43:56 - 44:02]: So, I think this this policy of responsible research and innovation.</p> <p>[44:02 - 44:16]: It just fall flat because it didn't connect to the really powerful policy actors and the policy and the interest, and as long as we are not able to connect with them, we have a hard time.</p> <p>[44:25 - 44:41]: And we have to continue with it because I think it's important, but we also have to know that it's not only, it's basically about. It's also about power and it's about legitimacy and it's, it's about taking away of power and it's empowering certain people,</p> <p>[44:41 - 44:43]: it's not always nice.</p> <p>[44:43 - 44:57]: It's not always easy, but we have to know the structures we have to know the power structures we have to know the important policy actors and if we cannot win it them we have to work around them.</p> <p>[44:57 - 45:04]: Sometimes we have to battle them, which is not very helpful, but sometimes necessary.</p> <p>[55:05 - 55:25]: Yeah, there's a fourth thing I think which is important is are we good enough in keeping giving people a benefit from participation? That's on the one hand, we are, we're strongly building on their intrinsic motivation.</p>
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		<p>[55:25 - 55:43]: But that if they wouldn't have an intrinsic motivation it wouldn't work. And it will also be hard to make a change and to have an impact. But what is also important I think is, and that's a not so big problem but more and more, I mean we have to give them also,</p> <p>[55:43 - 55:48]: we have to support them, we have to give them money for participation.</p> <p>[55:48 - 55:57]: We have to give them money for preparing for this.</p> <p>[05:50 - 06:06]: So, but if we want to have an impact, we have to enter into other systems of society and we have to play on their field and we have to play by their rules and with their means.</p> <p>[06:06 - 06:11]: So, therefore, it gets this kind of messy, it's not research anymore.</p>
Organization	<p>5. One-off or more permanent</p> <p>6. Degree of institutionalization</p> <p>7. Attitudes in the engagement community</p>	<p>[38:02 - 38:13]: So, for instance, we have a new member of the city's city government in Vienna, who is very open for participatory experiments.</p> <p>[38:13 - 38:35]: So there seems to be participatory budgeting, to a certain extent, and there seem to be because he went to Paris and was so impressed what has been done in Paris to, to, to do things which are modeled after the Paris example.</p> <p>[38:35 - 38:53]: But they are very few, and they are very experimental. And I think they are also not very well financed, and they are small, I mean they are.</p>
Planning	8. Timing	<p>[50:50 - 51:06]: So I think that on the one hand as an organizer, you're always scared and worried, will it work, will it work, will it work and your primary, your</p>

		<p>primary, your primary concern is to make it work.</p> <p>[51:06 - 51:22]: So that will you be able to identify the right people? Will you be able to recruit them? Will you be able to make them participate? Will you be able to continue to participate? What happens if they don't show up?</p> <p>[51:22 - 51:33]: And if you don't have enough people, how can you replace them? Will they be able to develop in the case of a citizen assembly?</p> <p>[51:33 - 51:42]: Will you be able to invite the right people to give expertise? Will they be able to write a report? How do you have to support them?</p> <p>[51:42 - 51:50]: So you're almost like a nanny or a nurse trying to make it work.</p> <p>[51:50 - 52:03]: And this is very important. You already, I mean, your main focus is on, does this project work and will they deliver what you promised?</p>
Method	9. Standardization	
Funding	<p>10. Funding for CE processes in general</p> <p>11. Funding for impact phase specifically</p>	<p>[52:03 - 52:18]: And then there's the question of impact. And although the European Commission always asks you about the impact, you never know how you can generate a long term impact, because the impact is dependent on funding.</p> <p>[52:18 - 52:30]: So in a project, the impact basically is beyond the project, because there is no money anymore.</p> <p>[52:30 - 52:42]: So if you would take this seriously, if you would have a three years project, then you would have maybe one and a half years for the project and the rest would be generating impact.</p> <p>[52:42 - 52:56]: So there's never structure and there's never structure and there's never money and personnel for really</p>

		generating this impact, because we know the impact happens maybe within the next five years.
Implementation	12. Evaluation	
Communication	13. Communication with public 14. Communication with policy makers and public officials 15. Public relations/"lobbying" work 16. The media	

**Interview 5:**

Code	Subcode	Quotes
Systemic issues	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Different conceptions of democracy</li> <li>2. Resistance from public officials or administrative systems</li> <li>3. Incentives</li> <li>4. Polarization</li> </ol>	<p>[06:53 - 07:22]: And you also must know but I'm sure that it's not new to you to you that Hungary, according to many is experiencing a democratic backslide recent years, and society have become more and more polarized in several ways, and, and it's not really easy.</p> <p>[07:22 - 07:32]: It's not really easy to, to have open dialogue between citizens.</p> <p>[20:09 - 20:17]: The local opposition that belongs to Fidesz the governing party of Hungary.</p> <p>[20:17 - 20:28]: We started to attack the process, and the former mayor, who now leads the, the local opposition.</p> <p>[20:28 - 20:52]: The former mayor you know, posted on social media that that he finds the whole process highly undemocratic and, and, and that they disapprove it.</p>



		<p>[20:52 - 21:11]: And the sense was that they kind of urge them, their electorate, not to not to register to apply even if they get an invitation letter from the mayor.</p> <p>[21:11 - 21:24]: So, we experienced that what it is like to, to organize a deliberative process in a rather, you know, hostile and challenging political environment.</p> <p>[27:57 - 28:18]: And the response was very interesting. Of course, none of those cities that are led by a mayor of the governing party.</p> <p>[28:18 - 28:41]: responded positively. And several of those cities where the opposition party, part one of the opposition parties, gives the mayor responded you know those cities, generally responded positively and they quite open not not every one of them.</p> <p>[28:41 - 28:49]: We're quite open for an initial discussion.</p> <p>[28:49 - 28:51]: 100% of them.</p> <p>[28:51 - 29:14]: And I mean those we talked to said that yes, they would love to have a deliberative process in this, because they see that it's a good way of engaging citizens and boost</p> <p>[29:14 - 29:29]: the level of citizens into local processes and yeah so they, I think they understood the advantages of the process.</p> <p>[34:38 - 35:02]: You know that you know we try to undermine and anyway you know your, your job is to support you, rather than creating an obstacle and, and most cases politicians understand by the end of this conversation, what they gain with these processes.</p> <p>[35:02 - 35:13]: And I think that you know the generally the more knowledge. They</p>
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		<p>have about the process they're more willing to host one or organize one.</p> <p>[35:13 - 35:34]: So I think that that later on, I actually am quite optimistic in this regard, and believe that should they have a stable budget.</p> <p>[35:47 - 36:07]: People are fed up with the online petitioning and demonstrations that result in nothing. Absolutely no impact and even you know the, the, the opinion leader.</p> <p>[36:07 - 36:15]: I don't know influencers experts journalists, they're quite critical about these old processes.</p> <p>[36:15 - 36:23]: So, so the yet again another online petition.</p> <p>[36:23 - 36:25]: Again, we reach nothing.</p> <p>[36:25 - 36:34]: So I think that there's an appetite, a quite comfortable appetite to have new, new processes.</p> <p>[37:19 - 37:35]: Some just you know, right, it's very unfortunately, very rare to have an external process that involve you know independent stakeholders as well.</p> <p>[37:35 - 37:43]: Which is pretty sad I mean I would love to work with cities.</p> <p>[37:43 - 37:47]: Where the mayor belongs to the governing party.</p> <p>[39:54 - 40:16]: So, yeah, that there's that government loves to emphasize that you know that they that it listens to the people and they consult citizens.</p> <p>[40:16 - 40:25]: So the government in a certain way the government appeals to the, to the idea of deliberative process processes are kind of</p> <p>[40:25 - 40:54]: the government hasn't organized the deliberative processes, you know, at national level, government close think tanks, however, launch certain</p>
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		<p>processes that in certain elements, you know resembled proper deliberative processes.</p> <p>[40:54 - 41:09]: But I doubt those processes were very transparent, really.</p> <p>[07:05 - 07:16]: And also the other thing that I find absolutely fundamental is as the bureaucracy, the local level bureaucracy.</p> <p>[07:16 - 07:29]: Do public officials also want this process, do they want it? Do they understand the importance?</p> <p>[07:29 - 07:44]: Because the politicians and the political will, it's also the bureaucracy that also has to be fully in the process. And that is a big challenge as well.</p>
Organization	<p>5. One-off or more permanent</p> <p>6. Degree of institutionalization</p> <p>7. Attitudes in the engagement community</p>	<p>[54:15 - 54:33]: And, oh yeah, follow up, that is the, the, my other big fear is that once a process is organized, and it finishes it comes to its end. And there's a clear desire from participants to continue the process.</p> <p>[54:33 - 54:50]: You know that that follow up never happens.</p> <p>[06:43 - 07:05]: So nothing will change after one process, there need to be multiple processes. Often I think different types to keep people engaged and also politicians also come and go in a way, in a sense, so, so it must be deeply deeply rooted.</p>
Planning	8. Timing	
Method	9. Standardization	
Funding	10. Funding for CE processes in general	[01:28 - 01:38]: But, you know, the deciding factor here is, is money.

	<p>11. Funding for impact phase specifically</p>	<p>[01:38 - 01:50]: Do, do we as organizers have enough money to, you know, communicate effectively and reach out people.  [01:50 - 02:00]: Does the municipality have the money to organize these processes.  [02:00 - 02:06]: I just you know democracy is costly.  [02:06 - 02:10]: And when.  [02:10 - 02:15]: And when municipalities are in  [02:15 - 02:17]: the financial trouble.  [02:17 - 02:24]: Then of course, these processes rank lower on the list.  [02:24 - 02:31]: Yeah, so funding is a key issue. Absolutely. Yeah.</p> <p>[02:49 - 03:09]: So even some of the big is that the European the EU programs horizon and these programs that sometimes support these processes that they also often come in this kind of one off form where there is a grant period and then funding disappears and then all this work has been set up and all these processes have been set up but if no one then steps  [03:09 - 03:24]: into kind of like if the local municipality of the government doesn't so to speak, step in and replace the new funding which almost never happens, then, then the kind of infrastructure disappears again or is kind of which is a.  [03:24 - 03:43]: The EU should also understand that you know change does not happen from Wednesday to Thursday.</p>
Implementation	12. Evaluation	
Communication	13. Communication with public	[24:25 - 24:43]: The propaganda media immediately published articles, writing

	14. Communication with policy makers and public officials 15. Public relations/"lobbying" work 16. The media	that that NGO close to George Soros is buying up people. [24:43 - 24:57]: And, and, and then you know that they, they sort of implied that it's a fake process.
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**Interview 6:**

Code	Subcode	Quotes
Systemic issues	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Different conceptions of democracy</li> <li>2. Resistance from public officials or administrative systems</li> <li>3. Incentives</li> <li>4. Polarization</li> </ol>	<p>[30:35 - 30:45]: And so for the main, I mean, making the main selling point is also about finding the main challenges</p> <p>[30:45 - 30:53]: for making people, politicians, stakeholders, take this agenda on board right.</p> <p>[30:53 - 31:05]: And if you are pitching it as you know a political service. You are also doing that because you want to present this, not as an NGO or advocacy initiative, but something.</p> <p>[31:05 - 31:16]: So, so this is the challenges that you're trying to accommodate when you say this is a political service, and not a political program, you see what I mean.</p> <p>[33:16 - 33:24]: You always have the same challenge which is, it's very difficult to explain these kind of things in a nutshell.</p> <p>[33:24 - 33:34]: And if you're talking to people that don't know that citizen assemblies, you're gonna have to make quite an effort, and it's going to last quite some time to really explain to them in depth.</p> <p>[33:34 - 33:43]: What this whole thing is about. So why selecting people by lot, what's the advantage of that, why are we doing this, and so on.</p>

	<p>[33:43 - 33:56]: So the whole thing goes for all political discussions and also lobbying discussion, I mean, and as you can imagine, so the knowledge about citizens and these is not.</p> <p>[33:56 - 34:05]: It's not uniform so we had a lot of discussions with representatives that really didn't know too much about this whole kind of issue, even fundamentals.</p> <p>[34:51 - 35:04]: And sort of, but it's very hard to approach representatives, especially when they've been higher up and say to them, Oh, we would like to support this process but we actually can't really tell you what's it going to be about.</p> <p>[35:04 - 35:07]: Yeah, on the on the content level.</p> <p>[35:42 - 35:57]: So selling the process is probably the main challenge at the beginning, and really making people understand what it's about, and why you're doing it and why it could be an advantage for them too.</p> <p>[37:10 - 37:19]: Yeah, I mean, so going back so the most important thing would be to sell the process I think in the sense that that people really understand what's it about.</p> <p>[37:19 - 37:25]: And then it gets kind of more nuanced I'd say it really depends on who you're talking to.</p> <p>[43:19 - 43:38]: Because, I mean, if you're going to change existing political institutions, and sort of try to implement the shift and sort of implemented assembly, which is given certain powers, then, I mean, obviously, if somebody is going to lose power in politics</p>
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		<p>[43:38 - 43:41]: you always running uphill but.</p> <p>[45:36 - 45:52]: I mean, I don't work for the public administration so far, but I'm sure there's something like internal politics in public administration to and Switzerland has a totally different political system than the German is something that will change your assembly process.</p> <p>[45:52 - 46:00]: Yeah, yeah, yeah. And actually one question you get quite a lot is, why do we need that we have direct democracy.</p> <p>[48:30 - 48:40]: Like we said before, the biggest challenge would always be people not really understanding what you're doing and what you want from them. Yeah.</p> <p>[48:40 - 48:55]: Because a lot of times, politicians, especially when they sort of higher up in the system, you don't have a lot of time to just come to the bus things okay what you want from me, and then you sort of this short window of time we try to explain to them but they</p> <p>[48:55 - 49:05]: don't always necessarily get it. And one thing that did work very well though was involving citizens in these kind of discussions.</p>
<p>Organization</p>	<p>5. One-off or more permanent</p> <p>6. Degree of institutionalization</p> <p>7. Attitudes in the engagement community</p>	<p>[10:32 - 10:41]: So just to sort of this. I wouldn't say it's always necessarily better than institutionalized because it takes away a lot of freedoms for me.</p> <p>[16:04 - 16:21]: Yes, I wouldn't say that institutionalization is this sort of the, this is not a good option. I would never say that interesting we maybe have to think about what we're gaining with, and</p>

		<p>maybe because there's certainly downsides to it too.</p> <p>[16:36 - 16:49]: and implement them afterwards. And so we so we might have kind of model of bad institutionalization where you lose a lot of agenda setting power, where you more restrained and you hold public communications and so on.</p> <p>[16:49 - 16:56]: But there's no guarantee that the actual outcome of the assembly is going to be implemented in any way.</p> <p>[21:21 - 21:39]: And that is something which probably quite different from institutionalized assembly and said that we had a quite a big civil society support group of very different various organizations, just taking support or supporting communications on different levels</p> <p>[21:39 - 21:50]: and then moving it from life down to something like sports organizations and really also actors that weren't necessarily involved in the whole climate discussions.</p> <p>[21:50 - 22:05]: And also try to gain the support of other conservative actors like I know if you know in Germany for your way of like the firefighter unions. Yeah, like this very local prominent and rather conservative thing.</p> <p>[22:05 - 22:18]: And you have to get them on board for example like the National Union. And that that was quite important for the whole process and that is something you probably couldn't or wouldn't do when you have an assembly which is simply institutionalized in the way that it's</p> <p>[22:18 - 22:22]: attached to government.</p>
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		[24:43 - 25:00]: So, I think the trend literature is going towards how to institutionalize, but not so much about thinking about the whole political context and what it actually means to institutionalize and what you gain from it or what you lose, especially when it comes to.
Planning	8. Timing	
Method	9. Standardization	
Funding	10. Funding for CE processes in general 11. Funding for impact phase specifically	[25:25 - 25:43]: And I think the other thing would be that if you have an institutionalized process, then the whole budget and the whole effort for public relations and work on social media and so on is probably going to shrink a lot of probably going to be much [25:43 - 25:56]: less budget for it because I think the general thinking goes, why do that, because we already are attached to government so we're going to give the results to the people that are relevant and that's it.
Implementation	12. Evaluation	[18:42 - 19:00]: Well, I mean, the biggest challenge, or in hindsight, the biggest challenge is always to do some kind of impact measurement, because it's really really hard to do I mean that goes from most civil society efforts, a lot of times, and especially when it comes to sort [19:00 - 19:10]: of lobbying for civil society engagement and talking points and so on.  [20:45 - 20:56]: It's very difficult to really sort of assess the impact that the one point the other one is the whole public discourse obviously.

<p>Communication</p>	<p>13. Communication with public  14. Communication with policy makers and public officials  15. Public relations/"lobbying" work  16. The media</p>	<p>[27:58 - 28:13]: Doing a lot of lobbying effort or public relations effort when the assemblies over is going to be too late. Yeah, probably because then you have just sort of this list of recommendations and there's so many lists of recommendations flying around from all different</p> <p>[28:13 - 28:31]: different practice and lobby groups and so on and so on. So that that's not interesting anymore. So, very important thing for us to do was to really try and get people and more specifically politicians on board before and during the process.</p> <p>[50:11 - 50:23]: And it's way harder for any politician to sort of dismiss this thing oh well you the civil society organization or this lobbying group and why should I listen to you and so on.</p> <p>[49:05 - 49:17]: So when you talk to a politician and you have one or two citizens from her constituency, for example, which kind of joined the discussion saying oh I got chosen by law, then this whole process and so interesting.</p> <p>[49:17 - 49:25]: And then it's a whole other thing because then you really catch a lot more attention.</p> <p>[53:00 - 53:15]: So, when it comes to the whole communications and selling the process outwards I think it's probably pretty, pretty surely the whole civil society engagement aspect.</p> <p>[53:15 - 53:26]: So one trying to implement different actors during the agenda setting process already political</p>
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		<p>factions and civil society organizations but then building a support group really.</p> <p>[53:26 - 53:33]: Just group saying that we approve of this process, nothing more at the beginning because they don't know the results.</p> <p>[53:33 - 53:42]: And also a sort of civil society council really overseeing the process and sort of guaranteeing and building and giving it legitimacy.</p> <p>[53:42 - 53:49]: And there we also had, I mean there was Fridays for Futures and for example but there was also</p> <p>[53:49 - 53:56]: the car industry.</p>
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**Interview 7:**

<b>Code</b>	<b>Subcode</b>	<b>Quotes</b>
Systemic issues	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Different conceptions of democracy</li> <li>2. Resistance from public officials or administrative systems</li> <li>3. Incentives</li> <li>4. Polarization</li> </ol>	<p>So I think the problem we've gotten [03:23 - 03:27]: of the kind of tenders that DBT will often get and there are other organizations will get is to [03:27 - 03:35]: deliver a piece of public engagement, and it stops there. And we just don't do the work that we need [03:35 - 03:43]: to do in preparing a public authority to be to be ready for this to land, we often don't time it so [03:43 - 03:48]: that it lands well at the right point in the policy cycle or whatever, you know, it's kind of like, [03:48 - 03:54]: very often too often these things are stand standalone processes.</p> <p>[06:53 - 06:59]: entrenched interests, etc. So I just think that we both theoretically, and as in terms of practice,</p>

		<p>[06:59 - 07:03]: communication often comes a poor second to the public engagement as well. So I think we've got</p> <p>[07:03 - 07:10]: these, I think there's a, again, there's a sense in which we can do participatory democracy really</p> <p>[07:10 - 07:16]: well in the sense of, of how we engage citizens, but we haven't thought about how it links in with</p> <p>[07:16 - 07:21]: the either, either the, either the public administration or the, or communicates to</p> <p>[07:21 - 07:31]: broader stakeholders and, and, and, and publics. And, you know, that's partly a fault of where</p> <p>[07:31 - 07:37]: funding goes. And it's also partly a fault of funders who don't think about this stuff.</p> <p>[07:39 - 07:44]: You know, they like the sexy public engagement bit, they don't, I mean, you know, who wants to</p> <p>[07:44 - 07:49]: spend money, time and money trying to change the practices of public administrators and</p> <p>[07:49 - 07:56]: public officials</p> <p>[08:53 - 09:02]: trained to be rector to, you know, that the whole system of bureaucracy has not been designed with</p> <p>[09:02 - 09:11]: participatory democracy</p> <p>[30:28 - 30:34]: earlier point about what too many people studying Habermas, I think that deliberative democracy</p> <p>[30:34 - 30:40]: is still the kind of, is still the kind of dominant way of thinking about participatory</p> <p>[30:40 - 30:44]: processes. And for a long time, I haven't done it myself. But for a long time, I have been saying,</p> <p>[30:44 - 30:49]: and I've written on a couple of occasions that, you know, we should be looking at participatory</p>
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		<p>[30:49 - 30:54]: processes through different lenses, ends of agonistic democracy, you know, going back to ideas</p> <p>[30:54 - 30:57]: of participatory democracy, which are very different from deliberative democracy that</p> <p>[30:57 - 31:04]: we're that there's a paucity of kind of imagination and creativity theoretically, because we're wedded</p> <p>[31:04 - 31:12]: into this deliberative democracy framework. Now, how much of that has been through into practice</p> <p>[39:57 - 40:01]: it. So that's, that's the challenge we face is kind of like, public administration has been,</p> <p>[40:01 - 40:08]: as you know, evolving over, I, you know, we think about democratic administration has been probably</p> <p>[40:08 - 40:12]: with us for a couple of centuries and logics have built up over time. And we're, we're suddenly</p> <p>[40:12 - 40:17]: saying, now it's got to be participatory now it's got to be deliberative. And you've just got this</p> <p>[40:17 - 40:23]: kind of ossified way of doing things.</p> <p>I think the challenge that practice has</p> <p>[44:04 - 44:10]: is how do you, how do you deal with, for example, like, just take an example which is very often</p> <p>[44:10 - 44:16]: raised, is like the populist discourse.</p> <p>[47:29 - 47:32]: j and I think actually that there's work, really interesting work to be done</p> <p>[47:33 - 47:38]: where you kind of work creatively with some of these discourses, in order that you can</p>
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		<p>[47:38 - 47:43]: you can speak in the language of the populist, you can speak to those kinds of people who are</p> <p>[47:43 - 47:46]: who are feeling disenfranchised, and we do some of that work, but I think there's much more to be</p> <p>[47:46 - 47:52]: done</p>
<p>Organization</p>	<p>5. One-off or more permanent</p> <p>6. Degree of institutionalization</p> <p>7. Attitudes in the engagement community</p>	<p>And I think there is a, there is a naivety amongst many of us that somehow a good</p> <p>[11:06 - 11:11]: participatory process will cut through all of this in the same way, in the same way that, you know,</p> <p>[11:12 - 11:16]: participate a good participatory process, everyone will see the moral authority of it and it will,</p> <p>[11:16 - 11:23]: and it will have effect. I think there is a kind of tendency for, for, for people in this space to be</p> <p>[11:23 - 11:28]: a bit naive, a bit utopian. I think I am myself, you know, it's kind of like, I'm not saying anything.</p> <p>[11:28 - 11:34]: I don't think of myself in the same breath.</p> <p>I do think bureaucracy needs to change over time if we're serious about embedding</p> <p>[13:36 - 13:44]: participation as a, as a significant element of, of engagement. But there are things we can do now</p> <p>[13:44 - 13:52]: in terms of, and I suppose it is rethinking in a sense, but you know, there are, there are</p> <p>[13:52 - 13:59]: programs of training, cultural, cultural change programs. There are ways of incentivizing,</p> <p>[14:01 - 14:05]: motivating civil servants such that this becomes something that's attractive</p> <p>[14:06 - 14:16]: by, by, through things like leadership of senior, of senior officials of designating</p>

		<p>[14:16 - 14:23]: a particular actors within the bureaucratic system to champion participatory processes, to,</p> <p>[14:23 - 14:30]: to work alongside them, to actually change people's incentive structures, such that this</p> <p>[14:30 - 14:35]: becomes something that is seen as valuable rather than something is seen as an additional extra.</p> <p>[17:20 - 17:26]: yeah, people always, we all know this, we all go to the familiar, we all get attracted to the to</p> <p>[17:26 - 17:31]: the to the standard practice, the standard operating practice, or operating system,</p> <p>[17:31 - 17:38]: whatever we call it. And, and so so it's about how do you make participation part of that? Or how do</p> <p>[17:38 - 17:44]: you make it a dominant feature of that? And some of that is to do with training and repurposing,</p> <p>[17:44 - 17:50]: but also about how we how we organize participation. As I say, too much participation is</p> <p>[17:50 - 17:59]: one off is ad hoc disappears. And I think that that that's also part of the part of the challenge.</p> <p>[17:59 - 18:03]: I think where you know, it's coming where it's happening regularly, where there's political</p> <p>[18:03 - 18:09]: commitment for it, then you start to see administrations moving and you know, the</p> <p>[18:09 - 18:14]: political system moving in order to accommodate that</p> <p>[25:18 - 25:22]: there is you, is you build up a bit of infrastructure and you just don't fund it anymore.</p> <p>[25:22 - 25:27]: And there's no kind of, it's actually a term I haven't used and it fits in with the kind of</p>
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	<p>[25:27 - 25:32]: institutionalization embedding thing, which I'll come back to that in a second is that we don't</p> <p>[25:32 - 25:39]: invest in civic infrastructure. What we do is we do one-offs as if one-offs is infrastructure. That's</p> <p>[25:39 - 25:44]: not infrastructure by its nature is something that exists over time. And I think we don't,</p> <p>[25:44 - 25:51]: we don't invest in that. And as part of that, we, what, sometimes when we do institutionalize things,</p> <p>[25:51 - 25:56]: we don't embed them. So just because something happens regularly, it isn't, it isn't properly</p> <p>[25:56 - 26:00]: embedded within the system.</p> <p>[33:39 - 33:47]: as well. Yeah, which is not sexy. But it was a project a few years ago in the UK called NHS</p> <p>[33:47 - 33:54]: citizen, again, something that I wrote a piece with them with a couple of academic Ricky and John,</p> <p>[33:54 - 34:01]: I mentioned before. And in that project, they spent a quarter of the budget to build a public</p> <p>[34:01 - 34:10]: building. They spent a quarter of the budget on cultural change within the NHS. And so although</p> <p>[34:10 - 34:17]: they were charged with building an infrastructure for participation, they and they said actually</p> <p>[34:17 - 34:21]: quarter of the budget probably wasn't enough. They they there at least there was a segment of the</p> <p>[34:21 - 34:25]: budget that said, in order for this to happen, we also need to do this work within the</p> <p>[34:25 - 34:31]: framework of the government. Who's who's leading that? What is well and it doesn't exist anymore,</p>
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		<p>[34:31 - 34:36]: because it got it got really it was starting to work quite effectively. And the chief executive,</p> <p>[34:36 - 34:43]: I think that I think his phrase was shut the fucker down. Which I think we actually have got</p> <p>[34:43 - 34:49]: in the in the in the article. But because what actually happened is they created something that</p> <p>[34:49 - 34:55]: the top of the administration couldn't deal with because they were used to top down strategic</p> <p>[34:55 - 34:59]: planning. They weren't they didn't know what to do with these inputs that were often quite</p> <p>[34:59 - 35:04]: challenging that were coming up. And that was a failure again of kind of like the because it was</p> <p>[35:04 - 35:09]: a embedded it was a it was an institutionalized process. It was happening over time. It wasn't a</p> <p>[35:09 - 35:14]: one off thing</p> <p>You know, this was a</p> <p>[35:37 - 35:41]: pressure that was coming from the from an established participatory process. And in the</p> <p>[35:41 - 35:46]: end, what they did is they stopped funding it and it just died, you know. So that's a sort</p> <p>[35:46 - 35:50]: of really sad story in many ways. But it was really interesting that the designers of that</p> <p>[35:51 - 35:57]: had said to the NHS, if you want us to do this, we need to have money to do culture change as well.</p>
Planning	8. Timing	
Method	9. Standardization	
Funding	10. Funding for CE processes in general	[21:47 - 21:52]: won't get, you know, if they develop a kind of really critical position, they won't get the money

	<p>11. Funding for impact phase specifically</p>	<p>[21:52 - 21:57]: from the public authority. So they're in a kind of catch 22. But I think most of them are well aware</p>
<p>Implementation</p>	<p>12. Evaluation</p>	<p>[16:55 - 17:03]: simple stuff like, how is it, you know, how, how do we balance this against other sorts of social  [17:03 - 17:08]: inputs? And I think, you know, that's, that's what public administrators have always had to do.  [17:09 - 17:14]: And politicians do, of course, to a certain extent. And we're adding in something new,  [17:14 - 17:20]: which they don't really know how to quantify or qualify. Does that make sense?</p> <p>[23:10 - 23:14]: because I've spent, I'm spending too much time with practitioners and obviously my view,  [23:14 - 23:20]: my viewpoint is changing with some of this is how frustrated some of the practitioners are about some  [23:20 - 23:27]: of the, particularly the academic led Horizon projects where academics come up with these  [23:27 - 23:31]: kind of grand ideas about how they're going to solve everything, but take no interest in what  [23:31 - 23:35]: the, and the practitioners somehow have to deliver this. And that's kind of like, there is a,  [23:35 - 23:40]: I think there's a difference between Horizon projects that are led by practitioner,  [23:40 - 23:44]: practitioner led versus those that are academic led. And I think no one's really kind of grappled  [23:44 - 23:49]: with that</p>

		<p>[29:12 - 29:18]: democracy, so much stuff is happening, which has so many different qualities. And we don't have a</p> <p>[29:18 - 29:24]: system systematic way of collecting data, etc. So we tend, initially in this area, I think that</p> <p>[29:25 - 29:32]: it was really led by exemplary cases and that gave us a sort of unrealism. And then it went the other</p>
<p>Communication</p>	<p>13. Communication with public</p> <p>14. Communication with policy makers and public officials</p> <p>15. Public relations/"lobbying" work</p> <p>16. The media</p>	<p>[06:53 - 06:59]: entrenched interests, etc. So I just think that we both theoretically, and as in terms of practice,</p> <p>[06:59 - 07:03]: communication often comes a poor second to the public engagement as well. So I think we've got</p> <p>[07:03 - 07:10]: these, I think there's a, again, there's a sense in which we can do participatory democracy really</p> <p>[07:10 - 07:16]: well in the sense of, of how we engage citizens, but we haven't thought about how it links in with</p> <p>[07:16 - 07:21]: the either, either the, either the public administration or the, or communicates to</p> <p>[07:21 - 07:31]: broader stakeholders and, and, and, and publics. And, you know, that's partly a fault of where</p> <p>[07:31 - 07:37]: funding goes. And it's also partly a fault of funders who don't think about this stuff.</p> <p>[07:39 - 07:44]: You know, they like the sexy public engagement bit, they don't, I mean, you know, who wants to</p> <p>[07:44 - 07:49]: spend money, time and money trying to change the practices of public administrators and</p> <p>[07:49 - 07:56]: public officials</p>

**Interview 8:**

Code	Subcode	Quotes
Systemic issues	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Different conceptions of democracy</li> <li>2. Resistance from public officials or administrative systems</li> <li>3. Incentives</li> <li>4. Polarization</li> </ol>	<p>[23:41 - 23:45]: Jeg har også hørt politiker, der siger, at hvis vi nu tager, hvad borgerne siger,</p> <p>[23:45 - 23:49]: så har vi ligesom frataget den der stemme. Bullshit.</p> <p>[23:49 - 23:56]: Altså også usikkerhed om rollefordeling, når man ikke forstår, hvad borgerinddragelse er.</p> <p>[23:56 - 23:59]: Borgerne producerer noget, og politikerne tager det op og bruger det.</p> <p>[23:59 - 24:03]: Det er rollefordeling. Så er det absurd, at en politiker siger,</p> <p>[24:03 - 24:07]: jamen, så har jeg også frataget borgerne deres stemme, hvis jeg bare gør, hvad de siger.</p> <p>[25:01 - 25:05]: Og det mener jeg rigtig mange steder, der er, næsten i hele terrænet,</p> <p>[25:05 - 25:08]: hvor vigtigt det er, at politikerne i virkeligheden forstår</p> <p>[25:08 - 25:12]: deres egen institutionelle rolle og hvad for nogle redskaber de har i hænderne.</p> <p>[25:12 - 25:16]: Jeg tror, de er rigtig dårlige uddannede til det.</p>
Organization	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. One-off or more permanent</li> <li>6. Degree of institutionalization</li> <li>7. Attitudes in the engagement community</li> </ol>	<p>[08:26 - 08:30]: Fordi når man hører alle praktikere næsten sige,</p> <p>[08:30 - 08:32]: at der skal være armslængdeprincip,</p> <p>[08:32 - 08:35]: så er det jo en kilometer lang arm, de snakker om.</p> <p>[08:42 - 08:45]: Men i mine øjne er det kontraproduktivt,</p> <p>[08:45 - 08:51]: fordi en for lang arm gør, at der ikke er ejerskab.</p> <p>[08:51 - 08:55]: Der er ikke nogen dialog om indholdet.</p>

		<p>[08:55 - 08:58]: Det ville man kalde, at politikerne blander sig i framing.</p> <p>[10:25 - 10:28]: Hvad angår at vide om noget af politisk relevans, [10:28 - 10:31]: så skal armen i mine øjne være så kort som muligt i virkeligheden. [10:31 - 10:37]: Jo mere borgerne ved, hvad det er, der pågår i politiske diskussioner, [10:37 - 10:41]: og hvad de har løst, og hvad de ikke har løst osv., [10:41 - 10:44]: i mine øjne er det jo bedre, at det er sådan set. [10:44 - 10:46]: Jo skarpere bliver deres anbefalinger, [10:46 - 10:50]: og mere passer de ind i det politiske behov.</p> <p>vi startede i 1995 og sluttede i omkring 2000.</p> <p>[15:47 - 15:51]: Der lavede vi 30 cases på borgerinddragelser, [15:51 - 15:57]: som havde til opgave at rådgive politikere. [15:57 - 15:59]: Og vi har undersøgt forskellige... [15:59 - 16:01]: Vi har undersøgt for simpelthen, hvad projektlederne mente, [16:01 - 16:10]: det var forskel og hvor stor impact, de syntes, det havde og sådan noget. [16:10 - 16:17]: Og jeg mener, at man kan ikke overtolde jo, at optage. [16:17 - 16:22]: Men der var faktisk én ting, fordi vi var forskellige projektledere, [16:22 - 16:26]: altså vi var mange projektledere, der analyserede de her forskellige cases, [16:26 - 16:29]: så de også blev analyserede med de forskellige øjne. [16:29 - 16:32]: Men der var én ting, der stod klart.</p>
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		<p>[16:32 - 16:40]: Det var, at impacten var større, jo kort arm var.</p> <p>[28:40 - 28:46]: Så rådsstruktur, ligesom teknologirådet var,</p> <p>[28:46 - 28:52]: er super velegnet til at sørge for den der opfølgings- og presseplanlægning,</p> <p>[28:52 - 28:56]: og stadigheden i at prøve at få det sendt afsted.</p> <p>[28:56 - 28:59]: At den rent faktisk er tilstede.</p> <p>[28:59 - 29:05]: Det er projektkulturen og den her udliciteringskultur,</p> <p>[29:05 - 29:08]: den er langt mindre egnet til det.</p> <p>[29:30 - 29:35]: Man oplever, når man laver projekter for myndighederne,</p> <p>[29:35 - 29:40]: så oplever man en utrolig hurtig personalrotation.</p> <p>[29:42 - 29:46]: Man oplever også, at de personaler, man arbejder med,</p> <p>[29:46 - 29:51]: er super intelligente, skidesøde, ved gerne og alt sådan noget.</p> <p>[29:51 - 29:54]: Det er slet ikke det, men de er grønne.</p> <p>[29:55 - 29:59]: Det er ikke de erfarne folk, man får.</p> <p>[29:59 - 30:08]: Det betyder, at man sidder med en lav kundekompetence.</p> <p>[30:08 - 30:14]: Og måske endda i værste fald en skæv kundekompetence.</p> <p>[30:14 - 30:17]: For eksempel får man en antropolog.</p> <p>[30:17 - 30:24]: Det er tit antropologer, kommuner og den slags organisationer, der ansætter.</p> <p>[30:24 - 30:29]: Så sidder man med en antropologisk syn på de her metoder.</p> <p>[30:29 - 30:33]: Det her er ikke antropologiske metoder i mine øjne.</p> <p>[30:33 - 30:36]: Det er policymetoder.</p>
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		<p>[30:36 - 30:39]: Det er noget andet. [30:39 - 30:46]: Så kan man sidde med en skæv kompetence, som selv opfatter sig som kompetent.</p> <p>[32:57 - 33:03]: Når der kommer en lige fra antologistudiet og har været her et halvt år, [33:03 - 33:10]: og sidder med den her inddragelse og siger til nogen i teknik og miljø, [33:10 - 33:13]: her er der nogle anbefalinger, som vi skal gøre. [33:13 - 33:16]: De er konstruktive og borgerne bliver glade for, at vi giver dem op. [33:16 - 33:19]: Altså hvor meget vægt er der?</p> <p>[36:17 - 36:22]: Så vi har faktisk eksempler på det her med, at når man gør det seriøst nok, [36:22 - 36:26]: og man lader nogle seniorer tage sig af det, så bliver der også behandlet helt andet. [36:26 - 36:29]: Det er en erfaring.</p> <p>[36:29 - 36:34]: Og det får mig til at sige, at jeg synes, der mangler omkring borgerinddragelser [36:34 - 36:41]: en forståelse af, hvilke organisationsomlægninger, [36:41 - 36:48]: altså hvad er det for en organisationsomlægning, man skal lave for at få det her til at virke. [36:49 - 36:53]: Og jeg tror, at den er langt tungere end folk bilder sig af. [36:54 - 36:58]: Det handler ikke bare om at ansætte to mennesker og sætte dem ned i kontoret ned fra enden af gangen. [36:59 - 37:03]: Det her handler om at sige til sine mellemledere, hvis I ikke gør det her,</p>
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		<p>[37:04 - 37:08]: så er det fuldstændig ligesom, hvis I ikke lever op til budgettet, så har I et problem.</p> <p>[40:53 - 40:55]: Det er heller ikke politikerne, der mister magt.</p> <p>[40:55 - 40:58]: Det tror man tit, og det tror jeg tit, at det er der, hindringerne ligger.</p> <p>[40:58 - 41:00]: Hindringerne ligger nede ude mellem lederne.</p> <p>[41:00 - 41:03]: Det er dem, der mister magt, fordi pludselig kommer der en idé om,</p> <p>[41:03 - 41:08]: hvordan hovedskaden skal se ud, som planchefen i lang tid ikke har synes.</p> <p>[41:08 - 41:10]: Og nu siger borgerne, at det synes det.</p> <p>[41:10 - 41:14]: Og så handler hun klapper hælene sammen.</p> <p>[41:14 - 41:17]: Og fortæller politikerne om det, og det kan de ikke lide,</p> <p>[41:17 - 41:20]: fordi de synes ikke, at det skal til sådan noget.</p> <p>[41:20 - 41:26]: Og det er det, det er et meget konkret eksempel med.</p> <p>[41:26 - 41:28]: Det er sådan med planchef fra alle vejen.</p> <p>[41:28 - 41:31]: De har sindssygt stor magt, og de elsker det.</p>
Planning	8. Timing	
Method	9. Standardization	
Funding	<p>10. Funding for CE processes in general</p> <p>11. Funding for impact phase specifically</p>	<p>[27:16 - 27:22]: Hele fokus ligger på gennemførelsen af kerneaktiviteten.</p> <p>[27:22 - 27:27]: Og budgetmæssigt er det virkelig alvorligt,</p> <p>[27:27 - 27:29]: fordi skal man have en ordentlig opfølgning,</p> <p>[27:29 - 27:30]: så koster det faktisk noget.</p>



		<p>[27:30 - 27:33]: Det er faktisk et lang sejt træk.</p> <p>[27:33 - 27:38]: Og lange seje træk koster mange personalepenge.</p> <p>[27:38 - 27:45]: Så det er som en problem for,</p> <p>[27:45 - 27:51]: hvor stor et gennemslag det kan have.</p>
Implementation	12. Evaluation	
Communication	<p>13. Communication with public</p> <p>14. Communication with policy makers and public officials</p> <p>15. Public relations/"lobbying" work</p> <p>16. The media</p>	<p>[02:42 - 02:45]: Jeg har aldrig oplevet, at medierne har påtaget sig</p> <p>[02:45 - 02:49]: at facilitere formidlingen</p> <p>[02:49 - 02:54]: af både process og borgere i en konstruktiv dialog.</p> <p>[02:54 - 02:55]: Jeg har aldrig oplevet det.</p> <p>[05:38 - 05:45]: og det tror jeg, man vil kunne finde i rigtig mange borgendragelses rapporter,</p> <p>[05:45 - 05:53]: at der ligger enormt meget afdramatiserede drama i borgernes rapporter.</p> <p>[05:53 - 05:54]: Og det er jo absurd.</p> <p>[05:54 - 06:06]: Altså, det er jo absurd, at nyhedsdefinitionen hos medierne gør,</p> <p>[06:06 - 06:12]: at når noget, der potentielt er konfliktuelt,</p> <p>[06:12 - 06:15]: og nogen behandler det, så det ikke bliver konfliktuelt,</p> <p>[06:15 - 06:19]: så vi faktisk kan finde en løsning på det osv.,</p> <p>[06:19 - 06:25]: at så bliver det uinteressant. Det er virkelig mærkeligt.</p>

**Interview 9:**

Code	Subcode	Quotes
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<p>Systemic issues</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Different conceptions of democracy</li> <li>2. Resistance from public officials or administrative systems</li> <li>3. Incentives</li> <li>4. Polarization</li> </ol>	<p>[06:50 - 07:06]: It's very hard to explain to politicians what the immediate benefit, you have to tell them they have to do this for the greater good. And you're saying like, ah, everybody wants this but everybody also agrees that for example, especially the more diffuse effects</p> <p>[07:06 - 07:09]: on democratic support.</p> <p>[16:29 - 16:42]: And so, the dog is buried by all the people who feel threatened when you say that maybe this can be done differently. These are old journalists all union people, some old academics were invited on.</p> <p>[16:42 - 16:48]: This is the advocacy part. So actually what I tried to do the most.</p> <p>[16:48 - 16:58]: For me, I think the most functional ways to not go into debates with these people. I actually scan the horizon for a young politician that is, and just show don't tell.</p>
<p>Organization</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. One-off or more permanent</li> <li>6. Degree of institutionalization</li> <li>7. Attitudes in the engagement community</li> </ol>	<p>[18:35 - 18:50]: And sometimes there might be the attitude in this kind of engagement movement community that this course is simply just defined as being so good, so we don't have to join that game.</p> <p>[18:50 - 19:06]: I mean, they should buy into it because this is kind of a moral good, which is good for for everybody. But there's no moral agenda that flows just due to its more good, it's always about spin doctors and political communication.</p> <p>[21:52 - 22:10]: So to not how to anonymize this Southern European city who then decides to do a, oh, we'll do a citizen assembly but it's one on climate and they'll do it in two weekend, two</p>

		<p>weekend days a Saturday and a Sunday, everything from experts to.</p> <p>[22:10 - 22:30]: You're like, Okay, great I convinced you but then what you do is, so some of the barriers once you get into this is that, again, is if you don't have a number of standards, that's great in the sense that you then don't impose anything.</p> <p>[22:30 - 22:40]: But it also means that, I mean there's a there's a draw, you know there's a back, backside of that medal is that if there's no standards.</p> <p>[22:40 - 22:48]: Then you also leave it to the ones who then design or decide on it to decide what good assembly is.</p> <p>[33:05 - 33:09]: You can do it with a citizen's family. And so I mean, at this</p> <p>[33:09 - 33:15]: moment, it's a bit of free for all. What I would advocate for</p> <p>[33:15 - 33:19]: is that at least at a sort of national or regional level, some</p> <p>[33:19 - 33:25]: form of standardization, or more levels of what is acceptable is</p> <p>[33:25 - 33:30]: put forward. But also, for example, expertise, whether</p> <p>[33:30 - 33:33]: they're strictly related to the government or not.</p>
Planning	8. Timing	
Method	9. Standardization	<p>[37:42 - 37:45]: but when we do this, we really want everybody at the table, you</p> <p>[37:45 - 37:49]: know, because normally we don't we always get the very likely</p> <p>[37:49 - 37:53]: what they call dead trees. You know, the people with gray hair</p> <p>[37:53 - 37:57]: who come to all the meetings, who love being engaged, you</p> <p>[37:57 - 38:00]: know, the professional citizens, we want everybody. And then my</p>

		<p>[38:00 - 38:03]: reply is always like, Okay, how much money do you have? Yeah.</p> <p>[38:04 - 38:07]: You know, how much need to put into this? And so that's the</p> <p>[38:07 - 38:13]: technical answer. So the normative answer is, what, what</p> <p>[38:13 - 38:19]: do we consider a legitimate group of citizens that can take</p> <p>[38:19 - 38:22]: a decision, you know, that is considered that your normative,</p> <p>[38:22 - 38:26]: and then your technical is, how do you get illiterate people?</p>
<p>Funding</p>	<p>10. Funding for CE processes in general  11. Funding for impact phase specifically</p>	<p>[01:48 - 01:57]: Yeah, there is the problem is that most of the other forms don't cost money and don't cost.</p> <p>[01:57 - 02:05]: And so that's true. There is a lack of funding and actually that's a specific problem for me.</p> <p>[02:05 - 02:21]: Where feed a part of what we do, for example, which I've which I've been advocated for also within Council of Europe and other places that because the resource resources are not available.</p> <p>[02:21 - 02:33]: At some point, if this type of democracy is dependent on resources, you will get richer democracies depending on how rich your community is.</p> <p>[25:25 - 25:49]: Which means that you will get, you know, a suboptimal financial base to do your things on and you try to overstretch, but still you will not come out with a really convincing output compared to what you promised when applying for the funds because you had to apply or you have to propose more in order to get the funds and make a really good case.</p> <p>[25:49 - 25:56]: So, so in this, in this sense for me standards are important.</p>

Implementation	12. Evaluation	
Communication	13. Communication with public 14. Communication with policy makers and public officials 15. Public relations/"lobbying" work 16. The media	

**Interview 10:**

Code	Subcode	Quotes
Systemic issues	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Different conceptions of democracy</li> <li>2. Resistance from public officials or administrative systems</li> <li>3. Incentives</li> <li>4. Polarization</li> </ol>	<p>[09:10 - 09:31]: Well, the arguments are not only from this person but also we have spoken with other representatives of the research and academia, the arguments are that this is how say</p> <p>[09:31 - 09:38]: non expert opinion that citizens will give.</p> <p>[09:38 - 09:43]: And as such, they don't consider it valid in a way.</p> <p>[09:43 - 09:49]: Yeah. So, this is it.</p> <p>[15:08 - 15:25]: Yeah, open dialogue, and there is also this lack of experience in in the municipalities and from, you know, from, given that the municipalities are how to say.</p> <p>[15:25 - 15:30]: Focused on the local issues.</p> <p>[15:30 - 15:45]: For me this is, or they could become one of the best partners to work with, especially when we have you know some local issues to address.</p>

		<p>[15:45 - 15:55]: Do you think that the idea and concept of engagement is well understood at the municipal level.</p> <p>[15:55 - 15:57]: I don't think so. No.</p> <p>[15:57 - 16:05]: Do you think that it would be more welcomed if there was a better understanding.</p> <p>[16:05 - 16:10]: Yes. Yeah. So, so lack of understanding of.</p> <p>[16:10 - 16:16]: Yeah, lack of awareness.</p> <p>[16:43 - 16:57]: Well, so far we have a couple of projects where we work with a local</p> <p>[16:57 - 17:12]: in the municipalities. And the one is in Sophia, and the other one is in a smaller, smaller city in in the country as more municipality.</p> <p>[17:12 - 17:17]: And they don't really have experience.</p> <p>[20:02 - 20:17]: But you say you'd say there is like, so that the sort of this barrier, the lack of understanding the lack of knowledge and experience with this, this is, this is sort of a general thing that's that.</p> <p>[20:17 - 20:25]: Yes, I think you find both in the political system and with citizens and so on.</p> <p>[20:41 - 20:47]: I have to say that when we bring the citizens together.</p> <p>[20:47 - 21:01]: And after, you know, the first couple of hours when they get to know each other and understand what are the objectives of the meeting etc etc.</p> <p>[21:01 - 21:10]: In the end, we have always received very very positive feedback by citizens.</p> <p>[21:10 - 21:15]: So when they get, so to speak with the, when the, when the barriers overcome.</p>
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Organization	<p>5. One-off or more permanent</p> <p>6. Degree of institutionalization</p> <p>7. Attitudes in the engagement community</p>	<p>[34:24 - 34:48]: I see. I expect that you will get similar answers from other interviewees. Yeah. And I think that if we want to develop further, you know, engagement and cooperation.</p> <p>[34:48 - 35:14]: We have to involve as well. Yes, the authorities for which we want to, you know, organize a co creation approach in which we involve not only stakeholders but also citizens.</p>
Planning	8. Timing	
Method	9. Standardization	
Funding	10. Funding for CE processes in general	[30:12 - 30:23]: I mean one set of barriers which is that there's very seldom funding

	11. Funding for impact phase specifically	on the municipality side to become partners, even if they want to do that. [30:23 - 30:36]: So having that component as that funding modality as part of the, of the consortium, of course makes much easier to bridge the gap so to say.
Implementation	12. Evaluation	
Communication	13. Communication with public 14. Communication with policy makers and public officials 15. Public relations/"lobbying" work 16. The media	